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This second Survey follows the outlines adopted for the first and
serves the same purpose, which is to give a summary view of international
legal developments of interest to Florida, affecting not only areas immediately adjacent to seas around Florida, particularly the Caribbean, but
also the whole Western Hemisphere. Developments of world-wide significance will also be considered.
I.

GENERAL PROBLEMS

Recently, the role of law in international relations has been felt more
keenly than ever before. The idea that the world may continue to exist
only if order can be based on the rule of law has gained momentum.'
There is hardly an international event of consequence in which legal
implications are not a codetermining factor.' This phenomenon also gives
rise to difficulties in ascertaining workable rules of international law in
a rapidly changing world where the adjustment of the traditional international law (satisfactory in the pre-atomic missile age) to modern technical advances in communications, space exploits, and techniques in
making war, is imperative.
The paramount goals of the foreign policy of the United States include the safeguarding of the security of the nation and its free institu* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. Friedmann, National Sovereignty, International Cooperation, and the Reality of
International Law, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 739 (1963); Wright, Toward a Universal Law for
Mankind, 63 CoLUm. L. REv. 435 (1963).
2. Morse, Law and American Foreign Policy, 7 A.B.A. INT'L & COmP. L. BULL. 11
(1963); Schwebel & Gardner, The Case for International Law, 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 785
(1963).
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tions, the keeping of peace, and the participation in the accelerated political, social and economic progress of the world. As expressed recently
by Congress, these aims may best be achieved in a "worldwide atmosphere
of freedom."' Therefore, forces of freedom shall be strengthened by
aiding friendly nations in the development of their resources and improvement of their standard of living, by assisting them to realize their "aspiration for justice, education, dignity, and respect as individual human
beings," and by "establishing responsible governments." Since economic
growth is closely tied in with political democracy, free economic institutions, productive capacities and increased cooperation and trade among
countries, freedom of the press, information, and religion, freedom of
navigation in international waterways, and recognition of all private persons to travel and to pursue their lawful activities without discrimination
as to race or religion, should be encouraged. In striving toward these
objectives, controversies that may arise in relation to friendly nations
are to be resolved by "adjudication of the issues involved by means of
international law procedures available to parties."4
Translated into action these objectives create a host of legal problems, organizational, procedural and substantive, not only on the international plane, but also within domestic law.'
A. Latin America
Within the Western Hemisphere the realization of these goals requires not only actions of the traditional diplomatic or military nature,'
but also in its socio-economic aspects, unprecedented methods are called
for. The ever increasing pressure of the forgotten man in Latin America
has forced upon local governments and indirectly, upon the United States,
complicated schemes of international cooperation. The most significant
instrument of hemispheric cooperation, both in diplomatic as well as cultural and socio-economic matters, remains the Organization of American
States, " recognized by the United States as one of the significant regional
organizations. The role of the Organization has recently been proven in
the Cuban crisis though it became less impressive during its aftermath.
In socio-economic matters its activities consist of policy-making rather
3. Act for International Development § 102, 75 Stat. 424 (1961). See also THoMAS &
THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (1963); Dreier, The Organization oj American States and the United States Policy, 17 INT'L ORG. 36 (1963); Fitzgibbon, The Orga-

nization of American States: Time of Ordeal, 5 ORBis 74 (1961).
4. Act for International Development § 102, 75 Stat. 424 (1961).
5. See generally SENATE COmm. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HOUSE Comm. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH EXPLANATORY NOTS, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962).
6. RONNING, LAW AND PoITIcs IN INTER-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1963); HOUSE Comm.
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REGIONAL AND OTHER DOCUMENTS CONCERNING UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
6a. FENWICK, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES: THE INTER-AMERICAN REGIONAL
SYSTEM

(1963).
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than direct action. In view of this and the inherent diplomatic difficulties
within the organization, the United States decided to channel its main
contributions to the development of Latin America through its own Alliance for Progress. As defined in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962,' the
Alliance is based on the idea that aid should go to nations willing to help
themselves by mobilizing their own resources and by adopting reform
measures designed to "spread the benefits of economic progress among
the people." Assistance was to be furnished toward the "development of
human as well as economic resources, in the spirit of the Act of Bogota
and the Charter of Punta del Este."'
On their part, two groups of Latin American republics are continuing
their efforts at consolidating and gradually integrating their economies by
developing common markets.' Both the Latin American Free Trade Association ° and the Central American Common Market" are making
7. Act for International Development § 102, 75 Stat. 424, as amended by Foreign
Assistance Act, 76 Stat. 255 (1962), supplemented by Appropriations Act, 76 Stat. 1163
(1963).
8. Ibid. See also DREIER, THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
(1962); GORDON, A NEW DEAL FOR LATIN AMERICA: THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS (1963);
MANGER, THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1963) ; PAN AMERICAN UNION,
THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: ITS FIRST YEAR, 1961, 1962 (1963); Chayes, The Lawyer and
the Alliance for Progress, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 192 (1962) ; Felix, The Alliance for Progress; The Long and the Short View, 6 CENT. REV. ARTS & SCIENCES 323 (1962) ; Fitts, The
Role of the Alliance for Progress in Latin American Tax Policies, TAX INST. OF AMERICA,
TAX POLICY ON UNITED STATES INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 217 (1963); Hanson, The
First Year: Economy, 16 INTER-AMERiAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 31 (1962); Hanson, Notes
on the Alliance for Progress, 17 INTER-AMRICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 85 (1963); Hickey,
The First Year: Business, 16 INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 49 (1962); Hyde, Economic Development in General and Development Agreements, 105 RECUEIL DES COURS
(Hague) 271 (1963) ; Laylin, The Legal Climate for Private Enterprise Under the Alliance
for Progress, 41 N.C.L. REV. 364 (1963) ; Lleras Camargo, The Alliance for Progress: Aims,
Distortions, Obstacles, 42 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 25 (1963); May, The Alliance for Progress in
Historical Perspective, 41 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 757 (1963); Moscoso, Social Change and the
Alliance for Progress, 16 INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 73 (1962).
9. URQUIDI, FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A
COMMON MARKET (1962);

UNITED NATIONS,

MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN

LATIN AMERICA (1962) ; Mikesell, The Movement Toward Regional Trading Groups in Latin
America, in LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS 125 (Hirschman ed. 1961);
Perloff & Almeida, Regional Economic Integration in the Development of Latin America,
1 ECONOMIA LATINOAMERICA 150 (1963); Urquidi, The Common Market as a Tool of Latin
America's Economic Development, in LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS 151
(Hirschman ed. 1961); Economic Integration in Latin America, 17 RECORD OF THE N.Y.
C.B.A. 5 (Supp. 1962). Collection of documents in INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS
JURIDICOS

INTERNACIONALES,

INSTRUMENTOS

RELATIVOS A LA INTEGRACI6N

ECONOMICA EN

AMERICA LATINA (Washington, 1964).
10. The Free Trade Area, 5 ECON. BULL. LATIN AMERICA 7 (1962); Farag, The Latin
American Free Trade Area, 17 INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 73 (1963).
11. PINCUS, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (1962); Gigax, The Central
American Common Market, 16 INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 59 (1962); General
Situation and Future Outlook of the Central American Economic Integration Programme,
8 ECON. BULL. LATIN AMERICA 9 (1963). Staley, Central American Economic Integration,
20 So. ECON. J. 88 (1962). A new Charter of the Organization of Central American States
has been signed at Panama, on December 12, 1962; text in 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 235 (1963);
Engel, New Charter of the Organization of Central American States, 58 Am. J. INT'L L.
127 (1964).
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progress in spite of difficulties inherent in their economies, primarily due
to the small volume of trade within and among their countries, spotty
industrialization coupled with high production costs, particularly where
mixed industries have been developed (i.e., private and government controlled), and the lack of mass purchasing power.
Some problems causing frictions with Latin American countries have
recently been solved, one of which was the final settlement of the Chamizal boundary dispute with Mexico in July 1963.12 However, the controversy regarding the distribution of waters remains unsolved. 1" Talks
with Panama, which insists on its sovereignty over the Canal Zone, have
resulted in some measure of agreement. 14 An understanding was reached
with Brazil in March, 1963, on economic and financial matters, without
improving the badly drifting economy of the South American giant.' 5
B. The Caribbean
There is presently no area in the world of greater significance to
Florida than the Caribbean, not only because of its geographic proximity,
but also because of the role it has assumed in the hemisphere. Instead of
continuing toward an organic consolidation preparatory to the gradual
emancipation from European powers,' 6 an outpost of a new colonial
12. 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 480 (1963); Moore, The Chamizal Zone-Rivers & Revolutions on the Border, 17 Sw. L.J 86 (1963); Sepulveda, El Chamizal y Algunas Cuestiones
Diplomaticas Pendientes entre Mexico y los Estados Unidos, 12 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD
DE DERECHO DE MEXICO 487 (1962); Sepulveda, Areas of Dispute in Mexican-American
Relations, 17 Sw. L.J. 98 (1963). The agreement is in force, 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 49, 186
(1964); Gregory, The Chamizal Settlement: A View from El Paso, 1 Sw. STUDIES 1 (1963).
Presently, S. 2394 is before Senate designed to facilitate compliance with the agreement.
13. Piper, A Justiciable Controversy Concerning Water Rights, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 1019
(1962); Hundley, The Colorado River Waters Dispute, 42 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 495 (1964).
In regard to migratory farm labor: Hearings Before the House Agriculture Committee on
the Mexican Farm Labor Program, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; Agreement regarding
migratory workers signed Dec. 20, 1963, extending the Agreement of August 11, 1951, 2
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1940, as amended, T.I.A.S. No. 5492. Cf. Act to amend title 5 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, 77 Stat. 363 (1963).
14. 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 171 (1963); 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 246 (1963); Minger,
Panama, The Canal Zone and the Titular Sovereignty, 14 W. POL. Q. 544 (1961). The "flagsuit" is contained in Doyle v. Fleming, 219 F. Supp. 277 (D.C.Z. 1963). The Panamanian
position is presented in KING, EL PROBLEMA DE LA SOVERANIA EN LAS RELACIONES ENTRE
PANAMA Y Los ESTADOS UNmOS (1961); Abrahams, Nuestras Relaciones con los Estados
Unidos, 5 ANIUARIO DE DERECHO 233 (1961); Benedetti, El Problema de la Soberania en la
Zona del Canal, 5 ANUARIO DE DERECHO 239 (1961); Reyes Testa, Nuestra Bandera y
Nuestra Soberania en la Zona del Canal, 5 ANUARIO DE DERECHO 249 (1961). On recent
developments following the break of diplomatic relations by Panama 50 DEP'T STATE BULL.
152 (1964); resolution of the O.A.S., 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 300 (1964); on the action before the U.N. Security Council, 11 U.N. REV. 6 (1964). Cf. BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERWATERWAYS, WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO INTEROCEANIC CANALS (1964). Note
Agreement with Panama regarding withholding of Panamanian income tax, 1963 T.I.A.S.
No. 15.
5445.U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in Economic and Financial Talks, 48 DEPIT
NATIONAL

STATE BULL. 557 (1963); investment guaranty agreement between the United States and
Argentina, signed June 5, 1963, 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 776 (1963).
16. MITCHELL, EUROPE IN THE CARIBBEAN: THE POLICIES OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND
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empire, the Sino-Soviet bloc has been established. Smoldering fires on the
islands, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of Haiti and the
Dominican Republic, as well as in the adjacent mainland, particularly
in British Guiana 17 and the independent republics of Colombia and
Venezuela, add to the unfortunate disarray, both in terms of international
as well as internal matters." The most disquieting area, Cuba, brought
the hemisphere, if not the world, to the brink of atomic war.
C.

The Cuban Crisis

Tension between the United States and Cuba increased after Castro's
open alignment with the Sino-Soviet bloc. The United States imposed an
embargo on trade with Cuba on February 7, 1962,"0 which prohibited
the importation into the United States of all goods of Cuban origin and
of all goods imported from or through Cuba, as well as on all exports
from the United States to Cuba. Moreover, no assistance was afforded to
the Republic.2" When the situation further deteriorated, Congress, in a
Joint Resolution of October 3, 1962,21 invoked the Monroe Doctrine, the
Rio Treaty of 1947 and the Punta del Este Declaration, and declared the
United States to be determined to prevent "by whatever means may be
necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba
from extending, by force or threat of force, its aggressive or subversive
activities to any part of this hemisphere"; to prevent in Cuba "the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the
THE NETHERLANDS TOWARDS THEIR WEST INDIAN TERRITORIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1963); Parks, European Possessions in the Americas, 4 J. INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES 395

(1962).
17. On recent developments in the British possessions, see Kelly, The Jamaican Independence Constitution of 1962, 3 CARIBBEAN STUDIES 3 (1963). Change of the status of
Bahamas, 1963 PUBLIC LAW 118; Report of the Bahamas Constitutional Conference 1963
(Cmd. 2048); independence Jan., 1964. East Caribbean Federation, 1962 PUBLIC LAW 382;
independence constitution for Trinidad and Tobago, 1962. In relation to Jamaica note agreement regarding trade in cotton textiles, 1963 T.I.A.S. No. 5435, and agreement on economic,
technical and related assistance, 1963 T.I.A.S No. 5457. In relation to Bahamas note agreement with the U.K. regarding undersea test and evaluation center, 1963 T.I.A.S No. 5441.
British Guiana Independence Conference, 1962, adjourned, 1963 PUBLIC LAW 119.
18. SPRINGER, REFLECTIONS

ON THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST WEST

INDIAN FEDERATION

(1962) ; Archibald, The Failure of the West Indies Federation, 18 WORLD TODAY 233 (1962) ;
Bourne, The Federation of the West Indies, 13 U. TORONTO L.J. 135 (1960); Marshall, The
Federation of the West Indies: The End of an Experiment?, 15 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS
126 (1962); Proctor, The Functional Approach to Political Union: Lessons from the Effort
to Federate the British Caribbean Territories, 10 INT'L ORGANIZATION 35 (1956); Sherlock,
Prospects in the Caribbean, 41 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 744 (1963); Springer, Federation in the
Caribbean: An Attempt that Failed, 16 INT'L ORGANIZATION 758 (1962) ; Wallace, The West
Indies: Improbable Federation?, 27 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCIENCE 444 (1961); THE
WEST INDIES FEDERATION: FALL AND DECLINE, 17 INT'L JOURNAL (Toronto) 268 (1962).
19. 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962). On Cuba generally, ALVAREZ DIAZ (a.o.), UN ESTUrDO
SOBRE CUBA: COLONIA-REPUBLICA-EXPERIMENTO SOCIALISTA (U. Miami Press, 1963).
20. Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 § 620(1), 76 Stat. 255 (1962). Regarding the 1960
embargo, see P. & E. Shipping Corp. v Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 307 F.2d
415 (1st Cir. 1962); United States v. 34 Piper Pawnee Aircraft, 218 F. Supp. 244 (D. Fla.
1963).
21. 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
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security of the United States"; and, to work with the OAS and Cubans
for self-determination. Shortly thereafter, evidence became available that
offensive missiles of Soviet origin had been installed on the Island. This
precipitated an unprecedented crisis,22 and Florida became the center of
extensive military operations.
In his history-making speech of October 22, 1962, President Kennedy outlined the position of the United States. Considering the Soviet
military build-up in Cuba as a "threat to peace and security" in the sense
of the Rio Pact of 1947, brought about in violation of Soviet assurances
coupled with deliberate deception, the President stated that there was an
"unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted." It was
further asserted that the military build-up was a "clear and present
danger" which entitled the United States to take action, both through the
Organization of American States as well as the United Nations, without,
at the same time, "limiting our freedom of action." The President indicated that since "we no longer live in a world where only the actual firing
of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to
constitute maximum peril," a variety of actions was to be taken. Among
those were the imposition of a quarantine, the resort to the Organization
of American States and to the United Nations, and a direct appeal to the
Soviet Union (since Cuba did not appear as the protagonist) to "halt and
eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world
peace."

23

The same evening that the speech was delivered, a request was submitted by the United States for a meeting of the United Nations Security
Council, 24 accompanied with a draft resolution, demanding, inter alia, the
immediate dismantling and withdrawal of offensive weapons and the
dispatch of United Nations observers to Cuba. The next day, October 23,
the Council of the Organization of American States met as an organ of
consulation, and after a statement by Secretary Rusk,25 unanimously
22. For a helpful discussion, see Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or QuarantineInterdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1962). Documents are collected in LARSON, THE CUBAN CRISIS OF
1962: SELECTED DOCUMENTS

AND CHRONOLOGY (1962);

SMITH, WHAT HAPPENED IN CUBA:

A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1963). See also Crane, The Cuban Crisis: A Strategic Analysis of
American and Soviet Policy, 6 ORBIs 528 (1963); McWhinney, Canadian-United States
Commercial Relations and International Law: The Cuban Affair as a Case Study, in CANADA-UNITED STATES TREATY RELATIONS 135 (DEENER ed. 1963); Virally, A Propos de l'Affaire
de Cuba: "Diplomatie Tranquille" et Crises Internationales,8 ANNuAIRE FRAN;AIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 457 (1963).
23. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 715 (1962). Cf. Paolillo, Regionalismo y Accidn Coerciva
Regional en la Carta de Naciones Unidas, ANUARIO URUGUAYO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL

211 (1962).
24. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 724 (1962); Critical Situation in Caribbean Urgently Considered by Security Council, 9(11) U.N. REV. 6 (1962). Gardner, The United Nations in
Crisis: Cuba and the Congo, 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 477 (1963); Halderman, Regional
Enforcement and the United Nations, 52 GEo. L.J. 89 (1963).
25. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 720 (1962); FENWICK, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
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adopted a resolution calling for immediate dismantling and withdrawal
of all missiles and other weapons and recommended to member-states, in
accordance with articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, to take
all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of
armed force, which they may deem necessary to insure that the
Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the SinoSoviet powers military material and prevent the missiles in
Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active
threat to the peace and security of the Continent.
The resolution also required that the United Nations Security Council
be informed of this resolution in accordance with article 54 of the Charter,
and expressed the hope that United Nations observers would be dispatched to Cuba at the earliest moment.26
The same evening, the President issued a proclamation with the
27
stated purpose being "to defend the security of the United States.
Relying both on the Joint Resolution of October 3, 1962, as well as the
resolution of the Organization of American States, the proclamation
prohibited the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to
Cuba by measures to be taken by "land, sea and air forces of the United
States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by
other American States." Any vessel or craft proceeding toward Cuba was
subject to being intercepted and directed to identify itself, its cargo,
equipment, stores and its ports of call. The vessel was required to submit
to visit and search. Refusal to comply was to result in taking the vessel or
craft into custody. Force was not to be used except in case of failure or
refusal to comply with directions or regulations and only to the extent
necessary.
After a discussion in the Security Council and the active intervention by the U.N. Secretary General, as well as an exchange of letters2"
between the President and Khrushchev, the quarantine was lifted. A few
days later, the crisis was alleviated by a joint statement between the
United States and the Soviet Union without any intervention by Cuba.29
The action taken by the United States8 ° prompted an animated disSTATES: THE INTER-AMERICAN REGIONAL SYSTEM 245

(1963); Action by the O.A.S.: When

is Security Council Authority Required Under Art. 53 of the U.N. Charter, 10 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 837, 867, 869 (1963); MacDonald, The Organization of American States in Action, 15
U. TORONTO L.J. 359, 395 (1964).
26. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 722, 723 (1962).
27. Executive Order No. 3504, 27 Fed. Reg. 10401 (1962).
28. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 741 (1962).
29. 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 153 (1963).

30. Recent discussions of the basic issues can be found in the following sources: BOWETT,

SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); McDoucAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961); STONE,
AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION
(1958); THE INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND TE CUBAN CRISIS (Tondel ed. 1963);
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cussion among writers. The majority agree that the action taken was in
accordance with international law. A point particularly stressed was that
standards developed in the pre-atomic age can no longer apply, and that
the conflict has to be analyzed as one involving the United States and the
Soviet Union, and not Cuba. 8 A smaller though impressive group dissents.8 2 A third group maintains the surprising position that in situations
of this kind international law simply does not apply. 3
The negotiated outcome of the missile crisis afforded the United
States with only the promise of removal of missiles and bombers from
Cuba; this, however, did not change the fact of a Sino-Soviet affiliated
government in the Caribbean.84 In view of this fact, further measures
have been taken to implement the Joint Resolution of October 3, 1962.3
One measure which was adopted by the General Services Administration
Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 183 (1962); Falk, The
United States and the Doctrine of Non-intervention in the Internal Affairs of Independent
States, 5 How. L.J. 163 (1959); Fawcet, Intervention in International Law, a Study of
Recent Cases, 103 RECUEI. DES COURS (Hague) 347 (1962); Giraud, A Propos de l'Affaire
Cubaine, la Quarantine: l'Interdiction du Recours a la Force, la Theorie et la Pratique des
Nations Unis, 67 REVUE GiNkRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 501 (1963); Graber,
United States Intervention in Latin America, 16 YB. WORLD AFFAIRS 23 (1962); Higgins,
The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Practice, 37
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 269 (1962); Layton, The Effect of Measures Short of War on Treaties,
30 U. Cm. L. RaV. 96 (1962); Ronning, Intervention, International Law, and the InterAmerican System, 3 J. INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES 249 (1961); Plimpton, Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States: Threat or Use
of Force, 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 973 (1963); and Principles of International Law and
Cooperation Among States: International Law and Nonintervention, 50 DEP'T STATE BULL.
133 (1964).
31. Alford, The Cuban Quarantine of 1962: An Inquiry Into Paradox and Persuasion,
4 VA. J. INT'L L. 35 (1964); Ball, Lawyers and Diplomats, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 987, 989
(1962) ; Chayes, The Legal Case for United States Action on Cuba, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL.
763 (1962); Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFFAiRS 550 (1963); Remarks,
1963 PROC. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 10 (1963); Christol & Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The
Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba, 57 Am. J. INT'L
L. 525 (1963); Fenwick, The QuarantineAgainst Cuba: Legal or Illegal, 57 Am. J. INT'L L.
588 (1963); MacChesney, Some Comments on the Quarantine of Cuba, 37 Am. J. INT'L
L. 592 (1963); McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. J. INT'L
L. 597 (1963) ; Mallison, supra note 22; Meeker, The Role of Law in the Political Aspects
of World Affairs, 27 ALBANY L. REV. 194, 200 (1963); Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and
the Law, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 515 (1963) ; Partan, The Cuban Quarantine: Some Implications
for Self-Defense, 1963 DUKE L.J. 696; Raymond, Legal Implications of the Cuban Crisis,
3 SANTA CLARA LAW. 126 (1963) ; Seligman, The Legality of United States Quarantine Action
Under the United Nations Charter, 49 A.B.A.J. 142 (1963).
32. Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963) ; see also 1963 PROC.
Am. Soc. INT'L L. 9 (1963).
33. Acheson, Remarks, 1963 PROC. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 13 (1963), stated that the quarantine is "not a legal issue or an issue of international law as these terms should be understood." Id. at 14. The action taken was the "right action," but "wisdom for the decision
was not to be found in law, but in judgment," since, in the opinion of the former Secretary
of State, "principles, certainly legal principles, do not decide concrete cases." Id. at 15.
34. Montague, A Brief Study of Some of the International Legal and Political Aspects
of the Guantanamo Bay Problem, 50 Ky. L.J. 459 (1962); Reeves, The Cuban Situation
and the Political and Economic Relations of the United States and Cuba, 17 Bus. LAW.
980 (1962).
35. 28 Fed. Reg. 3706 (1963).
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was that no cargo financed by the current administration was to be
shipped from the United States in a foreign-flag vessel if the vessel had
called at a Cuban port. Furthermore, a far reaching economic blockade
affecting all assets of persons in Cuba was imposed in 1963.36 The blockade prohibited persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
from engaging in unlicensed transfers of United States currency to or
from Cuba. It also prohibited all other unlicensed transactions with Cuba
or Cuban nationals or transactions involving property in which there is
a Cuban interest. Cuban refugees in the United States and elsewhere,
nationals unless they were
however, were to be regarded as unblocked
87
acting on behalf of the Cuban regime.
D. Recognition of Governments
Due to the instability of Latin American governments and to the acceptance there of unconstitutional changes, the question of recognition of
de facto governments, i.e., governments which came into power outside of
constitutional processes, presents a practical diplomatic and legal question 8 involving national interests and sensitivities deeply imbedded in
Latin America. The prevailing test used by the United States in deciding
whether or not to recognize a de facto foreign government generally
follows the pragmatical, so-called Jeffersonian doctrine. This approach
36. 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (i963), as corrected, 28 Fed. Reg. 7427 (1963).
37. Additional measures have been imposed by the Foreign and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 76 Stat. 1163 (1963), which provides that no assistance shall be available to
any country which "sells, furnishes, or permits any ships under its registry to carry to Cuba,
so long as it is governed by the Castro regime . . . any arms, ammunition, implements of
transportation materials or strategic value, and items of primary strategic significance . .. ."
§ 107(a). Futhermore, no economic assistance shall be furnished to any country which "sells,
furnishes, or permits any ships under its registry to carry items of economic assistance to
Cuba so long as it is governed by the Castro regime . . ." unless the President determines
that such action would be detrimental to national interests. § 107(b).
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 77 Stat. 379, has prohibited any assistance to "any
government of Cuba, nor shall Cuba be entitled to receive any quota authorizing the
importation of Cuban sugar . . . or receive any other benefit under any law of the United
States, until the President determines that such government has taken appropriate steps
according to international law standards to return to United States citizens, and to entities
. . . or to provide equitable compensation to such citizens or entities for the property taken
from such citizens on or after January 1, 1959, by the Government of Cuba," § 301(e) (2),
with additional provisions against any country which failed to prevent its ships or aircraft
from transporting to Cuba any items of economic assistance, items of military significance,
or "any other equipment, materials, or commodities, so long as Cuba is governed by the
Castro regime" as well as transport such equipment, etc., from Cuba. § 301(e) (3). Cf. Baade,
The Legal Effect of Cuban Expropriations in the United States, 1963 DUKE L.J. 290.
38. Fenwich, The Problem of Recognition of De Facto Governments, 1 INTER-AMERICAN
JuR. YB. 18 (1949) ; The Recognition of De Facto Governments: Is There a Basis for InterAmerican Collective Action?, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 109 (1964) ; Wright, Recognition, Intervention and Ideologies, 7 INDIAN YB. INT'L AFFAIRS 89 (1958) ; Bierzanek, La Nonreconnaissance
et le Droit International Contemporain, 8 ANNUAIRE FRANIAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
117 (1963); RESTATEMENT, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrED STATES §§ 97-117
(1962) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. Comment, Current Problems Regarding the
Standing of Foreign Governments To Sue in American Courts, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 417
(1964).
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originally required the government to control the state machinery and
the people's acquiescence to change. A third requirement was subsequently added which called for new government to be willing and able to
comply with the international obligations of the country. Only temporarily
was a version of the Tobar doctrine followed under President Wilson's
policy that the new government be constitutionally established." Finally,
developed in relation to Communist China, another doctrine appeared
which declared recognition to be an "instrument of national policy which
is both its rights and its duty to use in the enlightened self-interest of
the nation."40
Attempts to formulate principles common to the Western Hemisphere
date back to 1924." 1 In view of the fact that in Latin America recognition
of a new government is frequently considered as an act of intervention
into internal affairs, the attempted solution was to do away with recognition by making it obligatory once the pragmatic requirements were met. A
draft was prepared for the 1928 interamerican conference in Havana, but
failed mainly because of opposition on the part of the United States which
objected to the implied duty to recognize. In 1930, a new approach was
suggested by Estrada." Speaking for Mexico, he suggested the abolishment of recognition altogether as an "insulting practice which offends the
sovereignty of nations and places them in a position by which judgment
of some sort may be passed upon their internal affairs by other governments,"48 but which leaves them free to continue or to withdraw their
diplomatic representation. This attempt changed the form rather than the
substance. The question reappeared at the Bogota Conference of 1948. 44
Resolution XXXV was adopted which declared that the continuity of
diplomatic relations was desirable, and that the maintenance or suspension of relations "shall not be exercised as a means of individually obtaining unjustified advantages under international law." This provision as
well as the interpretation that such acts do not "imply any judgment
upon the domestic policy of the government," had to remain a pious wish.
Equally unsuccessful was a draft prepared by the Interamerican Juridical
Committee at their 1949 Rio de Janeiro Conference which attempted the
impossible, namely, to reconcile all the conflicting opinions.4 5
During the recent years, the United States frequently has been
39. Stowell, The Doctrine of Continuing Constitutional Legitimacy, 25 Am. J. INT'L L.
302 (1931).
40. 39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 385 (1955).
41. THOMAS & TirwoAs, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 176 (1963) ; Irizarry
y Puente, The Doctrine of Recognition and Intervention in Latin America, 28 TUL. L. REV.
408 (1954) ; Irizarry y Puente, The Nature and Powers of De Facto Governments in Latin
America, 30 TuL. L. REv. 313 (1956).
42. Jessup, The EstradaDoctrine, 25 Am. J. INT'L L. 119 (1931).
43. 25 Am. J. INT'L L. 203 (Supp. 1931).
44. 1 ANNALS OF THE O.A.S. 136 (1949).
45. Freeman, The First Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, 44 Am. J.
INT'L L. 374 (1950).
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accused of continuing diplomatic relations with undemocratic or revolutionary regimes in Latin America instead of using non-recognition as an
apparently welcome method of "democratic" intervention. Trying to
please everyone, the recognition policy of the United States became inconsistent and pleased nobody. President Kennedy admitted this fact
when questioned about the Guatemalan coup:
No, we haven't got a consistent policy because the circumstances are sometimes inconsistent. What we are interested in
now is what assurance we get as to when a democratic government or when elections will be held .... When we have a clear
idea of that, and also what the position will be of the other...
countries . . .we will then be able to make a6 judgment as to
whether it is in our interest to proceed ahead.1
This lack of consistency is borne out by facts. With distinctions
between the withdrawal of recognition and the break or withholding the
establishment of normal diplomatic relations blurred, a government put
in power by a military coup in Argentina was recognized in March,
1962,' 7 as was the January, 1959, revolutionary Castro government4 8 and
the April, 1963, Guatemalan coup.49 The same happened with regard to
the military junta in Ecuador during August, 1963."' However, in a
similar situation in Peru during July, 1963, the Department of State
suspended diplomatic relations after deploring the "military coup d'etat
which has overthrown the constitutional government" as being "contrary
to the common purposes inherent in the interamerican system and most
recently restated in the Charter of Punta del Este which the former
government of Peru and other hemisphere republics pledged themselves
to support a year ago," by agreeing to "work together for the social and
economic welfare . . . within the framework of developing democratic
institutions. 5 0 One month later, finding that the junta was in effective
control of the government and the country, and pledged to fulfill Peru's
international obligations, and taking into account the restoration of constitutional guarantees and electoral rights as well as the promise on the
part of the junta to respect and defend the outcome of elections, diplomatic relations were resumed." A less formal method was adopted in
46. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1963, p. 10.
47. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 348 (1962). See Lieuwen, Neo-militarism in Latin America:
The Kennedy Administration's Inadequate Response, 16 INrE-AMERICAN ECON. AFFAIRS
11 (1963).
48. 40 DEP'T STATE BULL. 128 (1959), noting the new government's "intention to comply
with the international obligations and agreements of Cuba."
49. Recognition was extended after itwas ascertained that the "new government isin
to respect Guatemala's international obligafullcontrol of the county and has pledged itself
tions." 48 DEPT' STATE BULL. 703 (1963).
49a. 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 282 (1963).
50. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 213, 214 (1962).
51. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL.348 (1962). See also 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (1963) ;Needler,
UNITED STATES RECOGNITION POLICY AND THE PERUVIAN CASE, 16 INTER-AMERICAN
AFFAIRs 61 (1963). For background, see 15 Hisp. AM. REP. 737 (1962).
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relation to Haiti. Considering the Duvalier regime unconstitutional, the
United States informally "suspended" diplomatic relations for a short
52
time.
It may be added that in spite of suspended diplomatic relations with
Cuba,"8 the present Cuban government is still recognized by the United
States as the responsible international organ of the Republic. 4 Repeated
suggestions to withdraw the recognition in favor of a Cuban government
in exile have been futile. In addition to diplomatic considerations, such
recognition would be unwarranted by precedents'5 since recognition of a
government in exile presupposes that it was constitutionally established
and only temporarily forced out of the country by force of arms. In case
of Cuba, it is well known that all members of the earlier Castro government, now in this country, have resigned their positions and consequently,
lack continuing constitutional authority. The alternative to recognize
some kind of national committee, patterned, for example, after de Gaulle's
Free France, seems improbable, particularly after the experience with
Mir6 Cardona's Revolutionary Council."6
E. Space Law
In the area of space law, 7 no significant progress can be reported.
52. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1963, p. 1. Subsequent to the military coups in the Dominican
Republic and Honduras, the Secretary of State stated that the "establishment and maintenance of representative government is an essential element in the Alliance for Progress,"
and that "under existing conditions . . . there is no opportunity for effective collaboration
under the Alliance for Progress or for normalization of diplomatic relations," 49 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 624 (1963). On December 14, 1963, both military governments have been
.recognized after giving their pledges to hold elections before the end of 1965, 49 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 997 (1963). For background, see 16 Hisp. AM. REP. 1018, 1204 (1964) ; Martin,
United States Policy Regarding Military Governments in Latin America, 49 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 698 (1963).
53. 26 Fed. Reg. 921 (1961). Cf. P. & E. Shipping Co. v. Banco para el Comercio
-Exterior de Cuba, 307 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1962).
54. A letter by the Department of State of June 28, 1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 409
(1963), states that although diplomatic relations have been severed, recognition of the Castro
government as the government of Cuba has not been withdrawn, adding that this government "can sue or be sued in the United States courts on the same basis as any other
Government," a statement not supported by cases. For example, see Guarantee Trust Co.
v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) ; Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921) ; P. & E. Shipping Corp. v. Banco para el Comerdo Exterior de Cuba, 307 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1962).
Cf. RESTATEMENT § 390; Dade Drydock Corp. v. The M/T Caribe, 199 F. Supp. 871 (Tex.
1961).
55. Brown, Sovereignty in Exile, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (1941); Oppenheimer, Governments and Authorities in Exile, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 368 (1942). Cf. RESTATEMENT § 114;
1 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 921 (1963).
56. 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 709 (1963).
57. GOLOVINT, CONFLICT IN SPACE: A PATTERN OF WAR IN A NEW DIMENSION (London,
1962); GOLSEN, OUTER SPACE AND WORLD POLITICS (1963); HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GovERNMENT (1963); McDoucAL, LASWELL & VLASTIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE (1963);
SCHWARTZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SPACE COOPERATION (1962); SEARA VAZQUEZ,
INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO COSMICO (Mexico, 1961); Bayitch, International Law, 16 U.
MIAMI L. Rav. 240, 247 (1961) ; Berger, Legal Problem-Subjects of Cosmic Space Exploration, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 54 (1962) ; Cayes, InternationalOrganizations and Space Law, 48 DEP'T
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Following the United Nations Resolution58 reported in the previous
Survey, a subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer
Space met in Geneva in 1962 without reaching an agreement. In view of
this, the General Assembly adopted a resolution59 on December 19, 1962,
noting with regret that no recommendations have been made. The resolution invited all members to cooperate with the Committee and requested
it to continue working on "basic legal principles governing the activities

of States in the exploration or use of outer space," as well as on liability
for accidents and return of astronauts and their vehicles. The Assembly
also referred to this Committee proposals submitted by the Soviet Union,
the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The proposals by the United States dealt with assistance to and return
of space vehicles and personnel, questions of liability for space vehicle
accidents, and principles relating to the exploration and use of outer
space. A legal subcommittee met early in 1963 and reported only that a
useful exchange of views took place.6 °
II.

TREATIES

The treaties6 1 of the friendship and commerce type have gained in
importance under the extended program adopted by the United States to
encourage the role of free enterprise in "raising levels of production and

standards of living essential to economic progress and development." 62 As
a means of furthering this policy, the same act charged the Administration to "accelerate a program of negotiating treaties for commerce and

trade, including tax treaties," and, conversely, to "seek, consistently with
the national interest, compliance by other countries . . . with all the
STATE BULL. 835 (1963); Cooper, Current Developments in Space Law, 41 N.C.L. REv. 339
(1963) ; Crane, Law and Strategy in Space, 6 ORBis 281 (1962) ; Crane, Basic Principles of
United States Space Policy, 22 FED. B.J. 163 (1962) ; Gardner, Outer Space: Problems of
Law and Power, 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 367 (1963); Garner, Extending Law Into Outer
Space, 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 568 (1962); Gore, United States Policy on Outer Space, 48
DEP'T STATE BULL. 21 (1963); Jaffe, Reliance Upon International Custom and General
Principles on the Growth of Space Law, MILITARY L. REv. 167 (April, 1963); Johnson,
The Developing Law oj Space Activities, 3 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1963); Mankiewicz, The
Regulation of Activities in Extra-aeronauticalSpace, and Some Related Problems, 8 McGILL
L.J. 193 (1962); Simone, Space: A Legal Vacuum, MILITARY L. REV. 43 (April, 1962). See
also a panel discussion on the status of competing claims to the use of outer space in 1963
PROC. Am. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 173-207 (1963).
58. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 16th Sess. (A/1721) (1962), 9 U.N. REV. 56 (1962).
Simsarian, Outer Space Co-operation in the United Nations, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 854 (1963).
59. 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 43 (1963).
60. 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 620 (1963).
61. Bayitch, International Law, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 240, 248 (1961); TREATIES IN
FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1963 (1963); see also Treaties Signed by the United States That
Are Not Yet in Force as of Feb. 6, 1963, 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 284 (1963) ; Bishop, Reservations to Treaties, 103 R.CUEIL DES COURS (Hague) 249 (1961); Piper, Navigation Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 11 Am. J. ComP. L. 184 (1962).
62. Act for International Development, 75 Stat. 424 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2151-271 (Supp.
III, 1962).
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treaties for commerce and trade and taxes," as well as to assist United
States citizens in "obtaining just compensation for losses sustained by
them or payments exacted from them as a result of measures taken or
imposed by any country in violation of any such treaty."6 3
However, the number of such treaties recently signed or ratified is
surprisingly small. A treaty of friendship and commerce was concluded
with Belgium in 1961 and went into force in 1963.64 Not yet in force is a
similar treaty with Luxembourg which was signed in 1962 and ratified
by the President.6 5 The work on tax treaties with Latin America seems
to be at a complete standstill.65a

A limited ban on atomic testing, signed in Moscow in 1963, was
quickly ratified.66 Special treaties regarding aviation, extradition and
consular6 7privileges are mentioned under the appropriate heading of this
Survey.
III.

LAW OF THE SEA

The international conventions on the law of the sea adopted in
Geneva in 19586' are only slowly gaining ratification. The United States
has ratified the four conventions on November 9, 1962,69 but declined a
number of reservations 70 made by other countries. 7 In the meantime, a
number of valuable studies have appeared.72
63. 22 U.S.C. § 601(b) (3) (Supp. III, 1962).
64. 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 648 (1963), T.I.A.S. No. 5432.
65. Treaties Signed by the United States That Are Not Yet in Force as of Feb. 6, 1963,
supra note 61.
65a. The Convention with Honduras for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, 8 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 219 (1957), was first terminated by Honduras, 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 25 (1964),
but remained in force, 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 312 (1964).
66. 2 INr'L LEG. MAT. 883 (1963), entered into force 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 658 (1963);
T.I.A.S. No. 5433.
67. Some municipalities in South Florida have enacted ordinances discriminating against
merchandise from Iron Curtain countries. While there may not be constitutional objections
against such ordinances, they may be in violation of treaties guaranteeing national or mostfavored-nation treatment. A California "Buy-American" statute, CAL. Gov. CODE § 4303,
had to yield to art. III, ff (5), pt. II, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
61 Stat., pt. 5, at A19. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 798, 808
(1962). According to newspaper reports (Miami Herald, Feb. 23, 1964, p. 12-G) the Miami
City Commission has turned down a request for such ordinance, while it was inacted in
Virginia Gardens. In Fort Lauderdale, a city ordinance prohibiting sale of merchandise from
any blacklisted nation has been found by the circuit judge to be unconstitutional when
used to prevent sale of beer manufactured with hops grown in Yugoslavia. Miami Herald,
Feb. 23, 1964, p. 12-G.
68. Bayitch, supra note 61, at 251.
69. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 862 (1962). At this time, only the Convention of the High
Seas is in force. 13 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2313 (1962); T.I.A.S. No. 5200. The importance of
this convention as well as the others, once in force, will be discussed in the next Survey.
70. 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 122 (1963).
71. The conventions were not in force as of October, 1963. In the western hemisphere
these conventions have been adopted by only a small number of countries: the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, by Haiti (1960), and Venezuela (1961);
the Convention on the High Seas, by Guatemala (1961), Haiti (1960), and Venezuela
(1961); the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
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As indicated in the previous Survey, the Geneva conventions did not
succeed in defining the breadth of the territorial waters. Though the
United States still officially adheres to the three-mile rule,7 3 pressures are
building up to extend the area of the United States control over adjacent74
seas, at least with regard to fishing. Prompted by Canada's revived plan
to extend her territorial waters with regard to fishing, to twelve miles, as
indicated recently at a meeting with the United States, 75 bills have been
introduced in Congress to expand the area 76 of United States control or to
make effective prohibitions against aliens fishing in the presently established area of territorial sea. Among these proposals, the Bartlett Bill has
been approved by the Senate and sent to the House.
Seas, by Colombia (1963), Haiti (1960), and Venezuela (1963) ; and the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, by Colombia (1962), Guatemala (1961), and Venezuela (1961). The
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes was not ratified by
the United States, and has been ratified in the western hemisphere only by Haiti in 1960.
72. McDOUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1962); SHIGERU ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES (1963) ; Bishop, The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1206 (1962); Shigeru Oda, The
Extent of the Territorial Sea: Some Analysis of the Geneva Conference and Recent Developments, 6 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 7 (1962) ; Svarlien, The Territorial Sea: A Quest
for Uniformity, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1962); Tacleff, Shrinking the High Seas by Technical Methods: From the 1930 Hague Conference to the 1958 Geneva Conference, 39 DETROIT
L.J. 660 (1962).
73. "There is no valid basis for the assertion by a coastal State of a twelve-mile exclusive fisheries zone." A letter by the Department of State, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 404 (1963).
74. Cohen, InternationalLaw and Canadian Practice, in CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE: Tn
CIVIL AND COMMON LAW IN CANADA 316, 337 (1958). For the present position, see 2 INT'L
LEG. MAT. 664 (1963). See also Morin, Les Eaux Territoriales du Canada au Regard du
Droit International, 1 CANADIAN YB. INT'L L. 62 (1963). A list of recently extended fishing
zones, see 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1122 (1963).
75. May 11, 1963, reported in 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 518 (1963).
76. Senators Gruening and Muskie proposed a bill to conserve the offshore fishery resources by establishing a fact finding board to report to the President who may by proclamation prohibit fishing by aliens up to twelve miles off shore and establish conservation zones
in these waters. S. 1816, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The Senate of Massachusetts, on
September 19, 1963, adopted a Resolution Urging the Congress of the United States to Take
Appropriate Action to Extend the Present Territorial Limits, 109 CONG. REC. 17370 (1963),
which points out the great extent of Soviet fishing off the Massachusetts coast and the
sharp decline of domestic landings. The Resolution urges to "extend the territorial limits
in regard to fishing rights from the present 3-mile to one of 200 miles."
77. S. 1988, H.R. 7954, H.R. 8296, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (protecting fishing in
United States territorial waters). After extensive hearings before the Senate Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Subcommittee (Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fishing in U.S. Territorial Waters of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1988, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963)), the bill was favorably reported to the Senate on September 12, with amendments,
and passed October 1, 1963. The bill makes it unlawful for any vessel, except a vessel of
the United States, to "engage in the fisheries within the territorial waters of the United
States, its territories and possessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or to engage
in the taking of any Continental Shelf Fishery resource which appertains to the United
States except as provided by an international treaty to which the United States is a party."
The bill also provides for issuance of fishing licenses to aliens as well as penalties for violation. 109 CONG. REc. 17561 (daily ed., Oct. 1, 1963). Presently the matter is regulated
by 75 Stat. 493 (1961), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 251 (1961). In regard to state law, see
Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1957); Organized Village v. Egan, 174 F. Supp.
500 (Alaska, 1959); United States v. Borja, 191 F. Supp. 563 (Guam, 1961).
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In Florida, similar interests have found legislative expression. In
order to protect state resources 78 to secure them for the citizens of
Florida, and to deny, within constitutional limitations, to "nationals of
alien neutral or hostile powers the right to draw upon the resources of
waters long considered by the immemorial usages of all civilized peoples
a part of our State and Nation," in 1963 Florida enacted the Territorial
Waters Act.7 ' Relying on Florida's right to "exercise and exert full
sovereignty and control of the territorial waters of the State of Florida," '
the act provides that no fishing licenses shall be issued in the following
cases:
(1) to vessels "owned in whole or in part by any alien power which
subscribes to the doctrine of international communism," or which "shall
have signed a treaty of trade, friendship or alliance or nonaggression pact
81
with any communist power";
(2) to any subject or national of a power which "subscribes to the
doctrine of international communism"; and
(3) generally to "any individual who subscribes to the doctrine of
international communism," regardless of nationality. 2
With regard to other alien vessels, the Board of Conservation is
instructed to "grant or withhold said licenses .. .on the basis of reci-

procity and retortion unless the nation concerned is designated as a
friendly ally or neutral by a formal suggestion transmitted to the Governor of Florida by the Secretary of State of the United States." In the
case of a formal suggestion, the Board is instructed to grant a license
"without regard to reciprocity and retortion, to vessels of such nation.""8
In general terms, the act provides that it is unlawful for "any unlicensed alien vessel to take by any means whatsoever, attempt to take, or
having taken to possess, any natural resource of the State's territorial
waters, as such waters are described by article I of the Constitution of
Florida." 4 Prescribed penalties will be imposed on violators, "provided
Recently, a new bill was introduced (H.R. 10492, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1964) proposing
to extend "complete and exclusive national sovereignty over waters within a line 12 geographic miles distant from the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast
of the United States which is in direct contact with the open sea, and the line marking the
seaward limit of inland waters."
78. Soviet trawler traffic in the territorial waters of the United States, particularly off
the coast of Florida, was discussed before the House Subcommittee for Special Investigations
of the Armed Services Committee, July 9, 10, 1963. Hearings Before the Subcommittee for

Special Investigations of Russian Trawler Traffic in U.S. Territorial Waters of the House
Committee on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
79. FLA. STAT. § 370.21 (1963).
80. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(2) (1963).
81. Ibid.
82. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(3) (1963).

83. Ibid.
84. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(4) (1963).
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that nothing therein shall authorize the repurchase of property for a
nominal sum by the owner upon proof of lack of complicity in the violation or undertaking."8 5 The act also adds that "no crew member or master
seeking bona fide political asylum shall be fined or imprisoned there-

under."

6

With regard to the continental shelf it is to be noted that in consequence of the Supreme Court adjudication in the controversy involving
claims on the part of the Gulf states,8 7 a number of bills88 have been
introduced in Congress to establish the seaward boundaries of Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana at three marine leagues into the Gulf and to
provide for the ownership and use of submerged lands, improvements,
minerals and natural resources89 there situated. 0
In view of the divergent positions taken with regard to the breadth
of territorial waters, particularly on the part of the republics along the
South Pacific coast, conflicts became unavoidable. In May, 1963, Ecuador
seized two American vessels within the claimed 200-mile area of its
85. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(8) (1963).
86. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(9) (1963). The new act was first used against 36 Cuban fishermen arrested by federal authorities for fishing within Florida territorial waters off Dry
Tortugas (Miami Herald, February 6, 1964, p. 2-A). However, the fishermen were released
on the ground that there is no federal law which would warrant prosecution, 46 U.S.C.
§ 251, 75 Stat. 493 (1961). The Secretary of State protested to Cuba and forwarded an information to the United Nations Security Council. 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 276, 279 (1964). The
fishermen were handed over to state authorities and brought to trial. On February 18, 1964,
the four captains were found guilty in a Key West court and fined $500 each while charges
against the 25 members of the crews were dismissed. Miami Herald, Feb. 20, 1964, p. 1.
On January 10, 1964, a vessel ran aground near Dry Tortugas and dumped oil fouling
the beaches. To prevent harm to animal life, beaches are being covered with sand from
the sea. According to newspaper reports, Miami Herald, March 15, 1964, p. 4-C, the commandant of the Coast Guard declared that the United States has no authority over the
dumping of oil outside its territorial waters. Cf. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1014, particularly
§ 1011(a) defining the prohibited zones as "all areas within fifty miles from land ....
87. Bayitch, International Law, 16 U. MIAMi L. REv. 240, 253 (1961). For legislative
background see Miami Herald, Feb. 9, 1964, p. 36-D. According to newspaper reports the
Department of State as well as the Florida Internal Improvement Board have declared that
a plan to build a club-casino on partially submerged reefs four miles off Elliott Key was "out
of their jurisdiction." Miami Herald, Aug. 27, 1963, p. 1, col. 2. The position of the Secretary
of the Interior, however, was not reported.
88. H.R. 3473-3480, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), were proposed to amend the Submerged Lands Act by establishing the seaward boundaries of Alabama, Mississippi and
Louisiana, as extending three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico. These proposals were
referred to the House Judiciary Committee.
89. SLOVENKO, OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TIDELANDS AND

ON LAND (1963).
90. Recent cases involving territorial waters and the continental shelf include: Guilbeau
v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co., 215 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. La. 1963); Ross v. Delta Drilling
Co., 213 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1962); Abbott v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); Williams v. Moran, Proctor, Muesler & Rutledge, 205 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
In re United States Air Force Texas Tower No. 4, 203 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Reed Constr. Corp., 149 So.2d 578 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) ; Collins v.
Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960). On quieting title in land on the
seacoast, see Ford v. Turner, 142 So.2d 335 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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coast." In spite of a plea by the Secretary of State to release the vessels,
Ecuador took them into port and imposed a fine of 26,272 dollars which
the Department of State advised to be paid under protest."2 At the same
time, negotiations had commenced to settle this question, however, without visible results. This incident and other similar actions caused Congress 3 to suggest that foreign aid going to Ecuador be reduced by the
amount of the fine. A bill also was introduced authorizing the President
to place embargo on certain fish and fish products "from any country
which interferes with the lawful activities of any citizen of the United
States in international waters more than three nautical miles off such
country.""

IV.

AVIATION

formulated,9 5

As recently
the United States international aviation
policy is to maintain the present framework of bilateral agreements, but
91. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1963, p. 6, col. 1. See also statement by Sen. Kuchel, 109
14937 (daily ed., Aug. 23, 1963), and a statement by the Secretary of State made
on June 5, 1963, 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 212 (1963). The legal basis for Ecuadorean claims is the
Ley de pesca y caceria maritima (Aug. 30, 1961), providing in art. 13 for a twelve-mile zone
as adjacent sea; however, article 4 contains a saving clause in favor of a larger area if
it should be established by an international agreement, in this case, the Chile-Ecuador-Peru
convention of 1956 (text in BAYITCH, INTERAMERICAN LAW OF FIsHERIES 42, 1957). According to information from the U.S. Embassy in Chile (June 29, 1963, N.C.A. Fishery Information Bull. No. 143, July 19, 1963) licenses for foreign fishing vessels will be, according to
a recent decree No. 332, available only through the Ministry of Agriculture, adding that in
1962 only two such licenses have been issued to Amercian vessels. On Peru see BELAUDE
GUnAssI, LA LEGISLAcI6N PESQUERA EN EL PERU (Lima, 1963).
Sen. Kuchel submitted to the Senate a list of harassments of United States vessels by
Latin American countries. 109 CoNG. REc. 20181-2 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1963). On the seizure
of an American vessel by Mexican authorities beyond the three but within the nine miles
zone off Mexico, see 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 899 (1963). In the French-Brazilian incident (June,
1962) regarding lobsters some twenty-two miles off the Brazilian coast, Brazil took the
position that lobsters are part of the continental shelf. For the French position, see 8
CONG. REC.

ANNUAIRE FRANqAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1021 (1963).

92. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1963, p. 6. Under article 3 of the Act to Protect the Rights of
Vessels of the United States on the High Seas and in Territorial Waters of Foreign Countries,
68 Stat. 883 (1954), owners of vessels may be reimbursed for fines paid. According to a
statement by Sen. Kuchel on the floor of the Senate, 109 CONG. REC. 20182 (daily ed. Nov. 6,
1963), the amount of $131,646.80 was paid under this provision during the fiscal year 1963.
93. Sen. Kuchel expressed concern. 109 CONG. REC. 14937 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1963).
Intervention was proposed by Rep. Pelly in the House. 109 CONG. REC. 9633 (daily ed.
June 5, 1963). H.R. 7602, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), to amend the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 and to provide for a method of reimbursement, was introduced. On Nov. 7, 1963,
the Senate adopted amendment No. 248 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, to amend
§ 620, by adding that no assistance shall be given to any country which has "extended, or
hereafter extends, its jurisdiction for fishing purposes over any area of the high seas beyond
that recognized by the United States, and [which] hereafter imposes any penalty or sanction
against a United States fishing vessel on account of fishing activities in such area . . . ." 109
CONG. REC. 20251 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1963). However, this amendment was deleted from the
final bill and it does not appear in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 379.
94. H.R. 6656, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
95. Statement on International Air Transport Policy (April, 1963), prepared by an
Interagency Steering Committee and approved by the President (Press release April 24, 1963).
See also Johnson, The International Aviation Policy of the United States, 49 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 508 (1963). On interamerican problems see CARVALHO, GEOPOLITICA DO TRANSPORTE
AEREO (Sao Paulo dos Campos, 1963).
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to decline division of markets as being totally unacceptable to basic trade
policies. Because the present network of international air routes are fully
developed, expansion should be approached with caution. The capacity
principle should remain flexible, thus retaining for airlines both an incentive and an opportunity. Carrier pools should not be encouraged, but
rates recommended by the International Air Transportation Association
should be maintained as a practical solution, with the reservation that
would ensure an effective government influence on rates through congressional legislation.
In terms of international law96 these aims are realized through multilateral or bilateral treaties, or through arrangements with domestic and
foreign carriers engaged in international air transportation, or their representatives, paticularly the IATA. Among the multilateral treaties the
Warsaw Convention is of particular interest since the continued adherence
by the United States is being questioned. Because of the drastic limitations on possible recovery, as compared with domestic standards, proposals have been made to withdraw from the Convention,97 raise the limit
of recovery, or to regulate liability by supplemental federal legislation.
Less controversial is the 1948 Geneva Convention, with additional ratifications coming in.9"
The litigation involving the interpretation of article 15 of the
96. BIN CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1962); BILLYou, AIR
LAW 123 (1963); MATEESCO MATTE, TRAIT]E DE DROIT A*RIEN-AARONAUTIQUE: EVOLUTION,

PROBLEMES SPATIAUX (Paris, 1964). On the status of aviation treaties in Latin America, see
COmIsI6N NACIONAL EJECUTIVA, PRIMERAS JORNADAS LATINOAMERICANAS DE DERECHO AERO-

NAUTICO, BUENOS AIRES, 1960 at 179 (1962); also Amorin Araujo, El Estado de Ratificaciones de las Convenciones Internacionales y su Influencia en las Legislaciones Internas de
Latinoamerica 385.
97. 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 362 (1962); Mennel & Simenone, United States Policy and
the Warsaw Convention, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 219 (1963). See generally Calkins, Hiking the
Limits of Liability at the Hague, 1962 PROC. OF THE SOC. INT'L L. 120; Lissitzyn, The
Warsaw Convention Today, 1962 PROC. OF THE Soc. INT'L L. 115; Karlin, Warsaw, Hague,
The 88th Congress and Limited Damages in International Air Crashes, 12 DE PAUL L. REV.
59 (1962) ; Metzger, Limit of Liability for Aircraft Accidents in International Transportation: The Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, 23 J. Am L. & Com. 254 (1956);
Sand, Air Carrier's Limitation of Liability and Air Passengers' Accident Compensation
Under the Warsaw Convention, 28 J. Am L. & CoM. 260 (1962); see also LUREAU, LA
RESPONSIBILITi DU TRANSPORTEUR AExiN: Lois NATIONALES ET CONVENTION DE VARSOVm
(Paris, 1961); McKenry, Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. Am L. &
Com. 205 (1963). In Latin America the Warsaw Convention has been ratified only by
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela; Paraguay may have ratified (Law 476, Sept. 12,
1957; PRM RAS JORNADAS LATINOAMERICANAS DE DEREChO AERONAUTICO, supra note 96, at
196). The Hague Protocol (1955), in force since August 1, 1963, was ratified in the Western
Hemisphere only by El Salvador, Mexico and Ecuador. El Salvador and Ecuador became
parties to the Warsaw Convention by ratifying the Hague Protocol, art. XXIII (2).
98. International Agreement on Rights in Aircraft, June 19, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 2847.
This treaty has presently been ratified by twenty-nine countries. Those within the Western
Hemisphere that have ratified include: Argentina (1958); Brazil (1953); Chile (1956);
Mexico (1953) (not in force in relation to the United States); Cuba (1961); Ecuador
(1958) ; El Salvador (1958); and Haiti (1961). See BAYITCH, AIRCRAFT MORTGAGE IN THE
AMERICAS; A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE AVIATION LAW WITH DOCUMENTS (1960).
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Chicago Convention, reported in the previous Survey,9" has been decided
on appeal in favor of the defendant Port Authority.1"' Starting from the
erroneous assumption that the "private rights of the appellees (foreign
carriers) include benefits from the most favored nation clauses," the
court nevertheless found the way back to the equal national treatment
clause in stating that "the contracting nations agreed to apply their laws
and regulations to the aircraft of all contracting states without distinction
of nationality.' "10 ' However, with regard to the crucial question of
whether, under the language of the Convention, charges imposed on
"aircraft engaged in scheduled international air services [shall not be
higher] than those that would be paid by its national aircraft engaged in
similar international air services," are entitled to the treatment agreed
upon between the defendant and a group of domestic carriers, or whether
they have to accept the treatment given to all other domestic carriers
engaged in international flights, the court stated, without giving any
reasons, that "there is nothing whatever in the treaty that would . . .
require appellant to afford the same bargain to appellees." The court
added that they have "at all times been afforded uniform conditions."
While the trial court expressly interpreted the national treatment clause
included in article 15 of the Convention as granting foreign carriers mostfavorable-national treatment available locally, in the sense of the most
favorable treatment granted by local schedules to domestic carriers
regardless of whether the foreign carrier fits the description or enumeration used by local schedules in defining these classes, the appellate court
disagreed. However, the court did not decide that the special arrangement between the Big Four and the Port Authority was not part of the
local law available to foreign carriers under the equal national clause,
nor did it find that the special arrangement, though part of national law,
was not available to foreign carriers, because they do not fall into the
class established by that agreement. Instead, the court volunteered the
prediction that the Big Four will "upon expiration of the twenty year
contract . . . join the class," i.e., a future uniform class of domestic

carriers, and, as a consequence, the "separate classification of the two
groups will then cease to exist and article 15 of the treaty will become
fully effective." 0 2 In the opinion of the court, this was also the "clear
import of the treaty," which in article 82 "recognizes outstanding inconsistencies." This again seems doubtful since article 821°3 deals only with
99. Bayitch, International Law, 16 U. MArII L. REv. 240, 259 (1961). See also Rijks,
Airport Charges Under Judicial Review, 9 NED. TijnscH. INT'L REV. 50 (1962).
100. Board of County Comm'rs v. Peruansa, 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 961, petition for rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 932 (1963). For a case involving unjust
discrimination in fees against domestic carriers, see City & County of San Francisco v.
Western Airlines, 22 Cal. 226 (1962). See also Note, 18 U. MIMvI L. REV. 482 (1963).
101. Board of County Comm'rs v. Peruansa, 307 F.2d 802, 807 (5th Cir. 1962).
102. Ibid.
103. The historical background of article 82 of the Convention is of no help. PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,

1944 386, 400,
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arrangements between countries or between countries and foreign carriers
inconsistent with the Convention. However, this provision has no bearing
on the present case since the arrangement between the Port Authority and
the Big Four is in no way inconsistent with the Convention which imposes
no provisions as to how domestic carriers should be treated with regard
to charges. Thus, the only issue that remains is how the domestic schedules apply to foreign carriers under article 15 of the Convention. In
concluding, the court stated that "the contracts [establishing preferential
treatment for the Big Four] subsist and so long as they do, appellees
cannot complain. °4 The court apparently overlooked the fact that foreign
carriers do not complain because the Big Four enjoy the fruits of their
bargain, but rather, because they themselves are excluded from sharing
them contrary to their interpretation of article 15 of the Chicago Convention.
Finally, the court raised the lack of consideration as a further justification for the decision. As already stated, the treaty provision involved
contains an equal-national treatment I0 5 and not a most-favored-nation
clause. 1 6 This is clearly discernible from the test of the Convention as
well as being apparent from the position taken by the plaintiffs who did
not invoke any treaty which had been entered into by the United States
with a third country which would become available under the mostfavored-nation clause. Moreover, this clause incorporates, in favor of
nationals invoking the most-favored-nation clause, only international
treaties and not arrangements entered into between a domestic state
agency and a group of domestic carriers. Even if this position were to be
contested, the conditional interpretation of the clause as being dependent
on consideration has been abandoned for quite some time, which deprives
Bartram v. Robertson10 7 of its authority.
426, 479, 1393 (1948). However, a careful analysis of article 82 shows it to be inapplicable
to the present situation. The first sentence abrogates provisions of all international agreements between countries accepting the Convention. The second sentence equally applies only
to international arrangements between countries bound by the Convention, and, a "noncontracting state or a national of a contracting state or a noncontracting State inconsistent
with the terms of this Convention." The application of this sentence presupposes, first, an
arrangement between one country bound by the Convention and a foreign country or
nationals thereof, but not their own nationals and, second, that such arrangements are
inconsistent with the Convention. The third sentence only implements the second by limiting
the duty to use best efforts to cases where "such inconsistent obligations" have been undertaken. In both respects, namely, being domestic and not international as well as not inconsistent with the terms of the Convention, the arrangement between the Big Four and the
Port Authority is clearly outside of the scope of this treaty provision.
104. Board of County Comm'rs v. Peruansa, 307 F.2d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 1962).
105. BAYITCH, CONFLICT LAW IN UNITED STATES TREATIES: A SURVEY 22 (1955).
106. Id. at 25. However, there is no standard known in treaty law as the most-favored
national treatment. Cf. RESTATEMENT § 158.
107. 122 U.S. 116 (1887). Another provision of article 15 of the same Chicago Convention was involved in a dispute between American air carriers and the Canadian Transport
Minister. According to reports, BUSINESS WEEK 138, February 16, 1963, Canada charged
since 1960 a fee for radio and other services to carriers flying over Canada and an additional
fee for merely passing through the Canadian airspace; however, this latter fee was not
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In the area of international criminal law an interesting case arose
in Florida.108 A federal court dismissed an indictment against defendants
for having forced the pilot to transport them in an aircraft from Florida
to Cuba, under the Federal Kidnapping Act' 09 and under the amended
Federal Aviation Act."0 With regard to the charge under the latter act
the district court held that the private airplane involved was not an
"aircraft in flight in air commerce," apparently interpreting the statutory
language as encompassing only commercial aircraft. On direct appeal the
Supreme Court held that section 101(4) of the Federal Aviation Act
includes "any operation or navigation of aircraft within the limits of any
Federal airway." Finding that this definition agrees with the intent of
Congress as expressed during its debates, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded with instructions to reinstate both counts of the indictment."' The question as to the locus delicti and as to the relation between
an act indictable both under the Federal Kidnapping Act and the Federal
Aviation Act, was, however not raised here. It was raised in a similar
case" 2 involving hijacking of a commercial airliner over New Mexico in
an attempt to divert it first to Mexico and then to Cuba. Since the crime
occurred before the amendment to the Federal Aviation Act regarding
hijacking came into force, the case was decided under the Federal Kidnapping Act and under the federal statute regarding transportation in
interstate commerce, of "an aircraft . . . knowing it to have been

stolen.""

83

It may be added that the trial court's decision in the anti-trust action
by the government against Pan-American World Airways which was
engaged in extensive operations in Latin America, was reversed and
remanded with instructions. The Supreme Court held that the decision on
assessed if the aircraft landed in Canada and paid landing fees. In view of article 15 of the
Chicago Convention that "[n]o fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory
of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property thereon," some carriers paid
under protest, while others simply refused to pay. An action was commenced in a Canadian
court against an American and a Dutch carrier, but was later dropped. AVIATION DAILY,
August 26, 1963.
108. United States v. Healy, 8 Av. Cas. 17,521

(S.D. Fla. 1962).

For international

developments see Draft Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Rome, 1962, 29 J. Am L. & Comm. 65 (1963); Report of the Legal Subcommittee,
28 J. AIR. L. & Comm. 285 (1963) ; the text of the subsequent Tokyo draft (1963) in 2 INT'L

LEG. MAT. 1042 (1963). Fitzgerald, The Development of International Rules Concerning
Offenses and Certain Other Acts on Board Aircraft, 1 CANADIAN YB. INT'L L. 230 (1963);
Wilberforce, Crime in Aircraft, 63 J. Roy. AERONAUTICAL SOC'Y 175 (1963). See also comparative discussion by SILVEIRA DA MOTA, AERONAUTICA E LEI PENAL NA AMERICA LATINA

(unpub. masters thesis, U. of Miami School of Law, 1962).
109.
110.
111.
112.

18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1958).
49 U.S.C. § 902 (1958).
United States v. Healy, 84 Sup. Ct. 553 (1964).
Bearden v. United States, 304 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded on

other grounds, 372 U.S. 252 (1962), modified, 307 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962). See Bayitch,
International Law, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 240, 260 (1961).

113. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1958).
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charges of major restraints of trade by division of territories and allocation of routes between air carriers was within the jurisdiction of the Civil
114

Aviation Board.

V.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The problem of sovereign immunity in international law involves the
amenability of foreign governments as organs of foreign nations, as well
as their assets, to local judicial proceedings. As already indicated in the
previous Survey, the original doctrine of absolute immunity has given
5
way to a limited, functional immunity."
The first question, whether or not a foreign sovereign or any of its
agencies may be brought into a court sitting in another country, presently
depends upon the character of the cause of action. Even if nongovernmental acts (jure gestionis) make foreign governments amenable to local
jurisdiction,"' jurisdiction still must be properly established. One of these
methods, attachment for jurisdictional purposes (quasi-in-rem), was discussed in Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Republic of Cuba.17 The court affirmed
that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign was "incidental to
and dependent upon the court's control over the res or property involved
at the commencement of the action." Therefore, a subsequent "accidental,
fraudulent or improper removal of the res from its control may render its
judgment hollow, and as a practical matter unenforceable, but will not
destroy jurisdiction or the validity of the judgment.""18
The second question is that of enforcement of judgments obtained
against a foreign sovereign. In the Berlanti case the question was before
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1958).
114. United States v. Pan-American World Airways, 371 U.S. 296 (1963), reversing, 193
F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), holding jurisdiction to be by statute vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board. Note, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 923 (1962); 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 593 (1963).
115. Bayitch, International Law, 16 U. MIAMi L. REV. 240, 266 (1961). See Borsody,
The American Law of Sovereign Immunity Since the Tate Letter, 4 VA. J. INT'L L. 75
(1964) ; Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963); Kennedy & Lynch, Some
Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity, 36 So. L. REV. 161 (1963) ; Niehuss, Sovereign
Immunity: The First Decade of the Tate Letter, 60 MIcH. L. REV. 1142 (1962); Note, 1962
DUKE L.J. 582. See also RESTATFMEXT §§ 68-75; Comment, The Castro Government in
American Courts: Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARV. L. REV.
1067 (1962).
116. Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1961), cited
in Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. S.S. Canadian Conqueror, 30 D.L.R.2d 172
(1961).
117. 145 So.2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
118. Id. at 258. Flota Maritima Browning v. Motor Vessel Ciudad, 218 F. Supp. 938
(D. Md. 1963) (delay in pleading immunity held waiver) ; Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l
City Trust Co., 207 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (by appearing as plaintiff in a federal
court the foreign sovereign did not permit transfer of action to a state court) ; Republic of
Cuba v. Arcade Building of Savannah, Inc., 123 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. App. 1961) (formal plea
of immunity necessary regardless of the fact that funds attached in a quasi-in-rem action
were government funds) ; Mirabella v. Banco Industrial de la Republica Argentina, 237
N.Y.S.2d 499 (1963) (bank created by special decree of the Republic of Argentina is not
immune as a governmental instrumentality).
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the court only in a particular sense. Holding that a subsequent removal of
assets attached for jurisdictional purposes does not destroy jurisdiction
once so established, the "permanent staying of execution" on the judgment was held erroneous. The court added that the plaintiff may "still
have execution on its judgment by levying on the property originally
under attachment should it in the future come within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.""' In United States v. Harris & Co. Advertising,
Inc.,120 the defendant pleaded sovereign immunity with regard to assets
attached after the assets, three airplanes had already been sold. The petition by the United States on behalf of the Republic of Cuba, interposing
the plea of sovereign immunity, was denied on the ground that the plea
was not timely.' 21 Interpreting the rationale of sovereign immunity
regarding assets of a foreign sovereign to be the prevention of "private
individuals from interfering with the goods, possessions or chattels of a
foreign nation in the judicial tribunals of the private citizen's country,"
held the plea untimely, "the chattels or possessions of the . . Republic of
Cuba ...having gone beyond the control of the courts at the conclusion

of the execution sales." In conclusion, the court also held that the plea of
immunity
cannot reach the proceeds of the execution sales because the
proceeds of said sales are not the property of the Republic of
Cuba ...but upon the sales [they] become the proceeds of the
judgment creditor. . . . The attempted pleas coming after the

expiration of the power of the trial judge to interfere with the
chattel of a foreign nation, the reason of the doctrine of sovereign immunity no longer existed, and, therefore, there was no
reason to apply the doctrine. 2 2
However, whenever in enforcement proceedings the plea of sovereign
immunity was timely made, courts have complied with the request with
regard to vessels' 2 aircraft, 124 and real property. 12 The position adopted
has been that taken by the Department of State in that the property of
the government of a sovereign state is immune from execution under
2
international law.1 0

119. Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 145 So.2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
120. 149 So.2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
121. Id. at 385. See also State ex rel. Nat'l Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle, 137
So.2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
122. United States v. Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc., 149 So.2d 384, 385-86 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
123. 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 528 (1962).

124. Ibid.
125. Id. at 531.
126. Mattei v. V/O Prodintorg, 321 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cuban sugar unloaded
from a British steamship under charter to Prodintorg, an agency of the Soviet government,
in Puerto Rico and there attached by Florida creditors).
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VI.

ACTS OF STATE

It is apparent that the act of state doctrine1 1 7 as a general rule is
being eroded by an increasing number of exceptions and refinements,
some of them reaching to the very core of its traditional scope. This is
due, first of all, to the realization that "this doctrine is a conflict of laws
rule applied by American courts; it is not a rule of international law."' 28
Consequently, the applicability vel non of a foreign governmental act,
both legislative and administrative (judicial acts being eliminated because they ordinarily involve resolutions of private disputes and do not
primarily reflect high state policy), will be decided according to the conflict law of the forum, subject to the still accepted privilege of the Executive to intervene in judicial proceedings by suggesting the extent to
which courts may question acts of foreign governments. However, in international conflicts situations general rules of international law unavoidably
enter the picture, mainly in two respects: by allowing the testing of the
foreign governmental act against substantive rules of international law,
as it happened in the Sabbatino case;' 29 or, by checking such governmental acts against standards adopted by international law with regard
to allocation of legislative powers between sovereign nations. As it will
by shown, the latter test is in many instances performed simply by relying on domestic conflict rules, apparently under the assumption that a
foreign country will have international jurisdiction to legislate in the
matter whenever conflict rules of the forum declare the law of such
foreign country controlling. This, of course, is but an emergency solution
since contacts used by the lex fori to identify the controlling foreign legal
system are not necessarily the same as those adopted by international
law in determining international legislative jurisdiction. Finally, it must
be added that the applicable rules of foreign law have to pass the checkpoint of the forum's public policy, which may, in various degrees, prevent
a rule of foreign law from being enforced in the forum, depending in
many instances on whether affirmative enforcement of a foreign rule is
sought or a mere defense is intended.
The act of state doctrine was involved in a number of federal cases
arising in Florida, involving insurance contracts between Cuban nationals
and domestic as well as foreign insurance companies. In Menendez v.
127. See Bayitch, supra note 115, at 271; Metzger, The Act of State Doctrine and

Foreign Relations, 23 U. Pirr. L. REV. 881 (1962); Comment, The Act of State Doctrine,
62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1278 (1962); Comment, International Law and the Act of State Doctrine, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 406 (1962); RESTATEMENT §§ 41-46.

128. Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429, 434 (5th Cir.
1962).

129. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 307
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4220 (1964) (brief for the United States
as amicus curiae, 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1009 (1963); Dawson & Weston, Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino: New Wine in Old Bottles, 31 U. CH. L. REV. 63 (1963); Lillich, A Pyrrhic
Victory at Foley Square: The Second Circuit and Sabbatino, 8 VnLL. L. REV. 155 (1963).
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Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 3 ° the court, relying on the Sabbatino case,
held Cuban decrees to be "confiscatory and without standing in our
courts,""' which, of course, represents a most unfortunate reading of the
Sabbatino opinion. Nevertheless, the court insisted that the "point of
convergence in these cases is clear: our courts are not compelled by the
act of state doctrine to give force and effect to the decrees of the Castro
government in Cuba," overlooking that in the Sabbatino case a particular
Cuban decree was held inoperative as violating a particular rule of international law and that the affected parties were American nationals. Since
it is well settled that rules of international law do not apply as between
a sovereign and its own national, Cuban nationals are not protected by
international law in relation to their own government, except in an indirect way. This approach would be by an inquiry into the international
legislative jurisdiction of the government, or, putting it in conventional
terms, into the question of extraterritorial effectiveness of the acts regarding their own nationals outside of the national territory.
In insurance cases, therefore, the crucial issue from the point of view
of international law remains whether or not insurance contracts between
a domestic or foreign, non-Cuban insurance company and a Cuban
refugee are within the reach of legislative powers of the Cuban government. In view of different contacts with the various countries involved
and because of the different approaches taken by the courts, different
results have been reached. The act of state doctrine pleaded as a defense
against a demand for a declaratory judgment regarding the right to
receive the cash surrender value on an insurance policy issued by a
domestic insurance company was rejected in Pan-American Life Ins. Co.
v. Recio,'5 ' and its companion case, Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v.
Lorido, 33 on a set of facts identical with those in the Menendez case.
Florida courts avoided the act of state doctrine by resorting to conflict
rules, i.e., the lex loci solutionis, in this case American law. Holding that
the insurance contract entered into by a domestic corporation, payable in
dollars in the United States, "cannot be governed by Cuban laws as to
the method of performance,"'" 4 the court indicated that at least the performance of the contract was beyond the reach of Cuban legislative
powers. In such a situation, the court continued, the act of state doctrine
does not apply since the defendant domestic company did business not
130. 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962).
131. Id. at 436.
132. 54 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
133. In Raij v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 19 Fla. Supp. 162 (Cir. Ct. 1962), the court
held that the defendant's justification for nonperformance of the insurance contract, the
seizure of its business in Cuba, "as unfortunate and abhorrent as it may be, is perhaps an
incidental risk of defendant doing business in a revolutionary climate." Id. at 165. The
decision was affirmed on the authority of Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Recio, 154 So.2d
197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), in Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 156 So.2d 785 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1963).
134. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Recio, 154 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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only in the Republic of Cuba but also in the United States, and the "only
contact with the law of Cuba was the fact that [the policy] was sold to a
Cuban citizen." Therefore, the court declined to enforce the expropriation decrees enacted by the present government of Cuba, pleaded by the
defendant as an affirmative defense to excuse its nonperformance of the
contract. Similarly, the court declined the defendant's suggestion that the
company lost its Cuban assets, on the ground that "the total assets of the
appellant are pledged to the payment of the contract, and the contract is
payable in the United States.""'
The difference between the choice of law and the international legislative jurisdiction approaches was stressed in the recent opinion of Blanco
v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co.'3 6 Starting from the "futility of an appraisal of these matters by the choice of law rules," as exemplified in the
Recio case 137 and another Louisiana decision, 3 " the court found that
"neither the persons nor the subject matter of this action is subject to
the sovereignty of the present State of Cuba," because the assets of the
insurance companies within Cuba "bore no relationship to the transitory
causes of actions involved here, and obviously the domestic insurance
companies are not subject to the sovereignty of the present State of
Cuba."'3 9 With regard to the fact that the plaintiffs were Cuban nationals
by origin and as such, subject "in personam to the sovereignty of the
State of Cuba, and bound by the municipal law of Castro's Cuba," the
court held that the plaintiffs, being refugees, were "at present political
citizens of nowhere" and "civil citizens of Florida based on their domicile
here, and . . . possessed of our municipal rights and obligated for munic-

ipal duties,"' and as such, entitled to protection given generally to
insureds as against insurance companies, the remedy to be ascertained
under local law.
In another action on an insurance policy issued by a foreign insurance company,' 4 ' the plaintiff demanded the payment of the cash surrender value in dollars instead of Cuban pesos as offered by the defendant. Here, the court held that Cuba, as a sovereign country, had the
power to legislate on national currency and to determine that such currency (pesos) shall be the legal tender for the payment of obligations,
including those originally providing for payment in dollars. The court
held that the insurance contract between a Cuban national and a
Canadian company was "indigenous to Cuba," apparently meaning within
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 199.
221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Recio, supra note 132.
Theye y Ajuria v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 154 So.2d 450 (La. App. 1963),

4 VA. J. INT'L L. 117 (1964).

139. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Recio, supra note 132, at 227.
140. Id. at 229.
141. Confederation Life Ins. Co. v.Ugalde, 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) (Canadian
company).
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Cuba's international legislative jurisdiction and, consequently, controlled
by Cuban laws enacted subsequent to the issuance of the policy. Therefore, the original provision of the policy stipulating payment in dollars
was "eliminated by the sovereign, and there were substituted, contract
provisions that the United States dollars would not be legal tender for the
discharge of the obligations under the policy and that such obligations
were payable in Cuban pesos at par."14
Among the cases just discussed only a few considered the applicability vel non of the Articles of the International Monetary Fund, 4 '
particularly article VIII(2)(b): "Exchange contracts which involve the
currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control
regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this
Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territory of any member." In
other words, article VIII(2) (b) imposes upon all members of the Fund,
the duty to check "exchange contracts" against the exchange control
regulations of the country whose currency is involved to determine
whether or not such "exchange contract" is in violation of control regulations. In case the "exchange contract" is in violation of such regulations,
and assuming that the regulations declare such contracts unenforceable,
then the unenforceable status will have to be honored by all members of
the Fund. This means that an "exchange contract" may be under the
conflict rule of the forum governed by the lex loci actus, lex loci solutionis
or by the lex voluntatis (the law chosen by the parties' agreement).
Nevertheless, with regard to the effect to be given to the exchange control
regulations of the lex monetae (the law of the country whose currency is
involved), the conflict rules of the forum will not apply, nor will its public
policy be applicable, whenever the lex monetae provides that "exchange
contracts" in violation of exchange control regulations are unenforceable.
As a consequence, the forum will have no choice but to find such an
"exchange contract" unenforceable.'
142. Id. at 322. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the Ugalde decision with directions
to dismiss the complaint. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, Nos. 32,780, 32,803, Fla., Feb.
24, 1964. The court referred to Theye y Ajuria v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., supra note
138, and also invoked the International Monetary Fund Agreement. See infra note 151. See
also Comment, 18 U. MIAmi L. REV. - (1963).
143. 60 Stat. 1401 (1945)

(Bretton Woods Agreement).

ALEXANDROWICZ, WORLD ECONOMIC AGENCIES: LAW AND PRACTICE 172 (1962);
BAYITCH, CONFLICT LAW IN UNITED STATES TREATIES 62 (1957); GOLD, THE FUND AGREE-

144.

(1962); MANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY 378 (2d ed. 1953); Gold &
Lachman, The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the Exchange
MENT IN THE COURTS

Control Regulations of Member States, 89 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet)

666

(1962); Lachman, The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the
Unenforceability of Certain Exchange Contracts, 2 NEDERLANDS

TIJD. v. INT. RECHT 148

(1955); Madsen-Myrdall, The Bretton Woods Agreement's Article VIII, Sec 2(b), 25 ACTA
SCANDINAVICA JURIS GENTruM 63 (1955) ; Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Contracts Under

the InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867 (1953) ; Nussbaum, Exchange
Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421 (1950); Schnitzer, The
Legal Interpretation of Art. VIII (2)(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 47TH CONFERENCE (Dubrovnik, 1956) 299 (1957); Som-
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In Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco,'4 5 the court only slightly
touched upon the agreement indicating that the "application of the
Bretton Woods Agreement involved other questions of fact and law as to
which there is no proof in the record."' 46 Subsequently, in Menendez
Rodriguez v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co.,'47 this position was considered
as a rejection of the defendant's contention that the agreement requires
dismissal of the insured's complaint. In Branco v. Pan-American Life Ins.
Co., 4 ' the court simply held the agreement inapplicable "on the foregoing
grounds," none of which refers to the agreement itself. On the contrary,
the Louisiana court of appeal in Theye y Ajuria v. Pan-American Life
Ins. Co. 4 ' decided the case relying squarely on article VIII(2)(b), but
without raising any question involved in the applicability of the agreement to the case before the court. The same approach was later adopted
5
by the Florida Supreme Court in Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde."'
In Ugalde, the court held that "Florida Courts [were] .

.

.obligated by

the International Monetary Fund Agreement to apply the cited Cuban
Laws to the contracts here involved."
As simple as the treaty provision may look, its vague language is
bound to become the crux of any litigation involving the agreement. The
first question arises as to the meaning of the term "exchange contracts."
It may mean a particular type of contract involving exchange in the sense
of a transaction intended to transfer capital from one monetary system to
another, or it may be understood to include any type of contract, provided
that money is included as part of the contractual scheme, involved in one
way or another, in international payments. An attempt to find a reasonable interpretation has to start from the fact that no definition is supplied
by the agreement nor does the history of its drafting supply any indication as to the intended meaning to be given the term, except that the first
drafts used "exchange transactions" instead of "exchange contracts." The
first drafts added the phrase "in the territory of one member involving
currency of another." This qualification was later changed into its present
language.' 5' Consequently, a literal interpretation of the term used must
be attempted. The fact that the agreement utilizes the specialized term of
"exchange contracts," and not only "contracts involving currency of any
member," would indicate that the transaction to be covered by this provision cannot include just any contract involving foreign currency but only
a specified type of contract, namely, exchange contracts used for the
merich, Foreign Exchange Laws as Defense to Actions in the United States Courts, 1 Am.
J. ComP. L. 401 (1952).
145. 311 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1962).
146. Id. at 427.
147. 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962).
148. 211 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
149. 154 So.2d 450 (La. App. 1963); aff'd, 161 So.2d 70 (La. 1964).
150. Nos. 32,780, 32,803, Fla., Feb. 24, 1964.
151. DEP'T STATE, PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL CONFERENCE, BRETTON WOODS, 1944, 54, 334, 502, 543, 576, 655, 671 (1948).
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specific purpose of transferring money from one monetary system to
another. This interpretation excludes other types of contracts, i.e., the
non-exchange type. This category would include sale of goods, employment, or insurance contracts which involve monetary consideration flowing one or both ways, without making such monetary consideration a
means for international transfer of capital. The goods to be acquired, the
work to be done, the insurance to be bought, are the main characteristics
of such contracts, making the possible international implication of the
transfer of the monetary consideration simply an incidental matter. The
same result may be reached by considering the broader aspects involved
in treaty interpretation-the choice between liberal or strict interpretation. From the underlying scope of the agreement to avoid rather than to
foster controls and restrictions on the international movement of currencies, as well as from the fact that the provision imposes a restriction
on the sovereign adjudicating power inherent in members' sovereignty, it
may be assumed that the provision expressed in Article VIII(2)(b) of
the agreement is an exception imposed upon the free movement of capital
and upon the presumed plenitude of powers vested in members. These
factors would seem to require a strict, rather than liberal, interpretation.
Limiting the application of the term "exchange contracts" to transactions serving directly and primarily international transfers of capital,
further limitations flow from the agreement. These are that such contracts
"involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the
exchange control regulations of that member maintained and imposed
consistently with this Agreement ... ." The first limitation calls not only
for the application to exchange contracts involving the currency of a
member country and not others, but it also eliminates exchange regulations other than those which qualify as exchange controls, thus excluding
exchange restrictions. In this respect, the agreement itself draws a clear
distinction between exchange controls and exchange restrictions by
providing, inter alia, that member countries may
exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international
capital movements, but no member may exercise these controls
in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of
commitments,
except as provided in article VII(3) and
152
XIV(2).
This provision introduces an additional question which cannot be overlooked, namely, whether insurance contracts are "current transactions."
Luckily, this term is defined in the agreement as "payments which are
not for the purpose of transferring capital."' 5 8 This definition seems to
fit contracts serving non-transfer purposes, like employment, insurance,
152. Art. VI(3).

153. Art. XVIII(i).
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pension and similar agreements. Finally, in every case the unenforceability of an "exchange contract" in violation of exchange controls of
the member country depends not only on the proof that such controls
14
have been "maintained and imposed consistently with this Agreement,"'
but also, that such controls originate from the member country whose
currency is involved. Regulations enacted by member countries involving
other than their own currency remain, therefore, outside of the scope of
article VIII(2) (b).
These brief considerations suggest not only that weighty arguments
may be advanced for the proposition that insurance contracts do not fall
into the class of exchange contracts, but also, that they may be classified
as current transactions, or as transfers of funds "in settlement of commitments," particularly since, in most cases, none of the qualifications in
article VI(3), article VII(3) (limitations imposed by a formal declaration
of a member and the Fund or article XIV(2) (exceptions allowed for
the post-war period), apply. It is also manifest that the courts which are
resolved to rely in their decisions on article VIII(2) (b) have a long and
difficult way to justify its application.
In conclusion, a few remarks are in order regarding the interpretation given to article VIII(2)(b) by the Executive Directors of the
Fund.'5 5 Here again, the language of the agreement must be carefully
read: "Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement
arising between any member and. the Fund or between any members of
the Fund shall be submitted to the Executive Directors for their decision . . .,,""' This provision expressly limits the power of interpretation
conferred upon Executive Directors to controversies arising between the
Fund and its members or between members of the Fund. The power does
not include questions arising between private litigants in the courts. Consequently, these interpretative decisions have, at best, the authority of
international administrative rulings binding upon the executive branches
of the participating governments and are, as such, at least in this country,
not binding on the courts.' 5 7 Even if the interpretation should be considered binding, it resolves no questions of coverage.' 58
154. Art. VIII(2)(b).
155.. Text in,14 Fed. Reg. 5208 (1949), and Theye y Ajuria v. Pan-American Life Ins.
Co., supra note 138, at 543. Contra, International Bank for Reconstr. & Dev. & Internat'l
Monetary Fund v. All America 'Cables & Radio Inc., No. 9362, F.C.C., discussed in GOLD,
TE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 20 (1962).
156. Art. XVIII(a).
157. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921); 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 267 (1943).
158. For a discussion of American cases, see GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE
COURTS (1962). For a recent case, see Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Com. Co., 12
N.Y.2d 371, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963) (art. VIII(2)(b), no basis for damages). Cuba's withdrawal from the International Monetary Fund was announced on November 14, 1960. 43
DEP'T STATE BULL. 945 (1960). Nevertheless, Cuba still appears as a member. 1960 UNITED
NATIONS YEARBOOK (same in the volume for 1961). Such withdrawal is possible under article
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The act of state doctrine also appeared in other types of litigation.' 59
The traditional force of the doctrine was reaffirmed in National Institute
of Agrarian Reform v. Kane.' 60 In Kane, the plaintiff brought an action
against the Institute for damages arising out of the confiscation of assets
owned by a Cuban corporation in which he had a majority interest. The
defendant invoked the act of state doctrine alleging that the acts of
confiscation included assets situated in Cuba and which belonged to a
Cuban corporation, and therefore, cannot be reviewed by a foreign court.
The defendant's attempt to avoid the impact of the doctrine by alleging
that the acts were in violation of international law, that they were contrary to the public policy of the forum, and that the Department of State
had announced the effect of such decrees to be determined by the courts,
was unsuccessful. Distinguishing the Sabbatino case as one which was
brought by an arm of the Cuban government demanding affirmative enforcement, the court found that the plaintiff here, an American national,
sought to enforce a claim based on an alleged conversion committed in
Cuba by an allegedly invalid governmental act, and declined to "declare
the invalidity of a Cuban decree as a basis for creating a right of recovery
in the plaintiff." " ' In conclusion, the court held that to declare an act
of a foreign government, issued within its jurisdiction, invalid, would
amount to a "denial of the sovereignty of a foreign state," as well as
Xv(1) of the agreement. In Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka Nat'l Corp., 140 N.Y.S.2d 323
(1955), the court held that once the membership of the country whose currency regulations
are involved, has ceased to be a member of the Fund, no "valid reason currently exists to
frustrate our public policy, as expressed in the controlling statute, and thereby allow Czechoslovakia to take advantage of one of the privileges of fund membership . . . ." Id. at 326.
159. Other cases involving the act of state doctrine include: Banco do Brasil, S.A. v.
Israel Commodity Co., 215 N.Y.S.2d (1961) (exchange controls); Gonzales v. Industrial
Bank of Cuba, 227 N.Y.S.2d 456, 459 (1961) (negotiable instruments); Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguay de Cuba, 217 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1961), 240 N.Y.S.2d 247
(1962) ("intervened" business); R.C.W. Supervisor, Inc. v. Cuban Tobacco Co., 220 F.
Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (trade-marks of a nationalized corporation); United States v,
Frank, 223 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (contracts with a subsequently expropriated corporation); Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 325 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1963) (nationalized
Cuban corporation maintaining third-party action).
160. 153 So.2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). In Jorge v. Antonio Co., 19 Fla. Supp. 101, 105
(Cir. Ct. 1961), the court considered the "intervention" in a Cuban corporation's business
by the Cuban government as an act of sovereignty and consequently, "entitled to the same
recognition and sanctity as the acts of any other foreign government so recognized by our
country." The intervention was for "reasons in the public interest, and . . . not for purely
political, persecutory, discriminatory, racial or confiscatory motives." Id. at 108. As such,
these acts are "governed and controlled solely by laws, decrees, resolutions and proclamations
of the Republic of Cuba . . . . The legality and effect of the seizure and intervention . . .
and the rights of the government intervenor and of the former stockholders, directors,
officers . . . are matters which this court should not undertake to determine." Id. at 109.
On the ground that "neither the individual plaintiff, a national of Cuba, nor the corporate
plaintiff, a Cuban corporation, has a constitutional right to sue in this court," and the matters involved are "unrelated to this country, judicial circuit and state," the court dismissed
the ground of forum non conveniens. Id. at 110. See Man, Confiscation of Corporations,
Corporate Rights and Corporate Assets and the Conflict of Laws, 11 INT'L & ComP. L.Q.
471 (1962).
161. National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Kane, 153 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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"violate the tradition of judicial reluctance to act in areas of executive
prerogative."1 2 Relying on Underhill v. Hernandez,'63 the court, couching
its decision in terms of jurisdiction, held that it lacked jurisdiction over
the subject matter and dismissed the case.
The act of state doctrine in its original function was invoked in the
habeas corpus proceedings incidental to the extradition of Perez Jimenez 64 who alleged that the acts for which extradiction was requested
were executed by him in the "exercise of or under the color of his sovereign authority," and, therefore, not open to judicial review. Taking
advantage of the accusation that he was a dictator, the petitioner alleged
that this made him a sovereign and made his acts sovereign acts, including improprieties charged to him by the Venezuelan government. Regardless of the time-honored adage, turpitudinem suam allegans nemo auditur, 16 5 the court took pains to explain that in spite of the now gladly
accepted accusations of dictatorship, the appellant still was not in fact
or in law "the sovereign government of Venezuela within the Act of State
Doctrine,"' 60 nor were acts charged to him "acts of the Venezuelan sovereignty . . . but for the private financial benefit of the appellant. They

constituted common crimes in violation of his position and not in pursuance of it. They are as far from being an act 1of6 7 state as rape which

appellant concedes would not be an Act of State.1

Gradually, the attitude holding nationalization inherently illegal has
lost considerable weight in the courts. 6 ' Even though the extraterritorial
effect will remain a constant source of difficulty, it may be said that the
principle of complete sovereignty over a nation's natural resources has
The underlying principles have been best
been generally accepted.'
expressed by a 1962 resolution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, which declared that the "exploration, development and disposition of such resources as well as the import of foreign capital required
for the purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and conditions
162. Ibid.
163. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).

164. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962).
165. "One who alleges his own infamy is not to be heard." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY

(4th ed. 1951).
166. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, supra note 164, at 557.
167. Id. at 558.
168. FOUILLOUx, LA NATIONALISATION ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1962); Alfonsin,
La Regulacidn de las Expropriaciones y Nacionalizaciones desde el Punto de Vista de
Derecho, ANUARIO URUGUAYO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 27 (1962); Domke, Nationalization
of Foreign-OwnedProperty and the Act of State Doctrine: The Present American Attitude
Towards Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property, 1963 DUKE L.J. 281; Expropriation
in International Law, 48 IowA L. REV. 878 (1963). Cf. Expropriation of American Owned
Property by Foreign Governments in the Twentieth Century, 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1066 (1963).
169. UNITED NATIONS, THE STATUS OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL WEALTH
AND RESOURCES AND REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL

(1962); Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Organizations and the Protection of
Private Property, 90 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet) 627 (1963).
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70
which peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable.'
Therefore, the United Nations declared the principle that the "capital
imported and the earnings on that capital shall be governed by the term
thereof, by national legislation in force, and by international law." With
regard to nationalization, the resolution declared that it shall be based
"on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interests
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests,
both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State
taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance
with international law," adding, that in case of controversy, the national
jurisdiction of the state taking such measures shall be exhausted, and use
should be made of arbitration as well as international.adjudication.

Such profound changes in attitudes, of course, increase the probability of interference on the part of local authorities, with foreign holdings, which at the same time, are encouraged as a means of contributing
to the free development of other nations' economic potential. The United
States has undertaken a complex action to counteract encroachments on
United States foreign economic interests, particularly investments. One
action took on the form of a guarantee offering American investors protection not only against difficulties in converting foreign earnings or
investments into dollars, but also against losses in investments due to war,
revolution or insurrection.'' To encourage the participation of private
enterprises in the economic development of foreign countries, the President is expected to take
appropriate steps to discourage nationalization, expropriation,
confiscation, seizure of ownership or control, of private investment and discriminatory and other actions having the effect
thereof, undertaken by countries receiving assistance under this
Act, which divert available resources essential to create new
wealth, employment, and productivity in those countries and
otherwise impair the climate for new private investment essential to the stable economic growth and development of those
countries

172

170. 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 710 (1962); Mr. Stevenson's letter, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 406
(1963).
171. Presently regulated by arts. 221-24 of the Act for International Development of
1961, 75 Stat. 424 (1961), as amended by § 104 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, 77
Stat. 379 (1963). The term expropriation is defined as an "abrogation repudiation, or impairment by any foreign government, of its own contract with an investor, where such
abrogation . . . is not caused by the investor's own fault or misconduct, and materially
and adversely affects the continued operation of the project." Miller, Protection of United
Nations Investments Abroad: The Investment Guarantee of the United States Government,
32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 288 (1963). See also Note, The Investment Guaranty Program:
Problems of Administration, 64 CoLum. L. REV. 315 (1964).
172. Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, § 301, amending § 601(b) of the Foreign Assistance
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In an attempt to discourage wanton expropriation another method was
adopted in the Act for International Development of 1962 and amended
in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. This provision charged the President to suspend assistance to any country which, on or after January 1,
1962,
(1) has nationalized or expropriated or seized ownership or
control of property owned by any American citizen or by any
corporation . . . not less than 50% beneficially owned by
United States citizens, or
(2) has taken steps to repudiate or nullify existing contracts or
agreements with any United States citizen or corporation . . .
no less than 50% beneficially owned by United States citizens,
or
(3) has imposed or enforced discriminatory taxes or other exactions, or restrictive maintenance or operational conditions, or
has taken other actions, which have the effect of nationalizing,
expropriating, or otherwise seizing ownership or control of property so owned . . .173
Assistance will be suspended if such country fails within a reasonable
time, usually six months after its action has been taken, to submit the
claims to arbitration or
to discharge its obligations under international law toward such
citizen or entity, including speedy compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the value
thereof, as required by international law, or fails to take steps
designed to provide relief from such taxes, exactions, or conditions .... 174
Furthermore, no monetary assistance may be made to any country which
will be used to compensate owners for expropriated or nationalized property. Whenever the President shall find that assistance has been used for
such purpose, no assistance shall be granted "until appropriate reimbursement is made to the United States for sums so diverted." Finally, no
assistance shall be available after December 31, 1965, to "any less developed country which has failed to enter into an agreement with the
5
President to institute the investment guaranty program. ' 1 7
Act of 1961, supra note 171. See Clubb, Incentives to Private United States Investment
Abroad Under the Foreign Assistance Program, 72 YALE L.J. 475 (1963); Lillich, The Protection of Foreign Investment and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 17 RUTGERS L. REv.
405 (1963); Hammond, An Evaluation of the Investment Guaranty Program, 1 MANE L.
REV. 67 (1963).
173. Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 379, § 301(e), amending § 620 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
174. Ibid.
175. Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 379, § 301(i).
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MISCELLANEOUS

A. Diplomatic and Consular Privileges
Rules of international law regarding diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities have been restated in two draft conventions prepared by the International Law Commission of the United Nations. The
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations' has been followed
by the 1963 Convention on Consular Relations, 77 with the optional protocol relating to the settlement of disputes, all signed by the United
States, but not yet ratified. Two bilateral consular conventions have also
been signed in 1963 by the United States, one with Japan 78 and the
other with Korea. 7 9
Diplomatic immunity was pleaded by a member of the Cuban mission to the United States when charged with conspiracy to commit sabotage and violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act. In United States
v. Fitzpatrick,8 0 a Cuban claiming the title of "attache and resident
member of the permanent mission of Cuba to the United Nations," sought
release from custody on a writ of habeas corpus alleging lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the petitioner had no diplomatic immunity
in view of limitations on that privilege to functions within the scope of
his position, both under article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations
and under the Headquarters Agreement,' 8 ' as well as under general principles of international law. The court also declined to accept the petitioner's contention that exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme
Court under the Constitution,"8 2 and held that the constitutional provision
was only applicable to diplomatic representatives to the United States
and not to those accredited to international organizations, even if they
should have their seat within the United States, and also, because the
petitioner's position was not that of a "public minister."' 88
With regard to consular privileges, the response by the Department
of State to an inquiry from the Panamanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
176. Text in 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 1064 (1961). See RESTATEMENT §§ 76-85.
177. Text in 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 276 (1962). The United States also signed the Optional
Protocol Relating to Settlement of Disputes. Note, Consular Immunity: In Law and in Fact,
47 IOWA L. REV. 668 (1962). Consular functions regarding arrest of nationals are compiled
in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 411 (1963).
178. Consular Convention with Japan, signed March 22, 1963, 48 DEP'T STATE BULL.
546 (1963) ; text in 2 INT'L LEO. MAT. 746 (1963).
179. T.I.A.S. No. 5469.
180. 214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Subsequently, the petitioner was released to
Cuba in exchange for American nationals. N.Y. Times, April 23, 1963, p. 1.
181. 61 Stat. 756 (1947).
182. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2(2).
183. Comment, United States Jurisdiction Over Representatives to the United Nations,
63 CoLU M. L. REV. 1066 (1963); Visick, Regulating Nondiplomatic Activities of Representatives of Foreign Countries in the United States, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 977 (1963); Gormley, Privileges and Immunities of Personnel of Regional International Organizations, 32 U.
CiNc. L. REV. 131, 279 (1963).
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concerning a civil action for defamation and slander against a Panamanian consul in the United States may be mentioned."8 4 The Department
replied that it is for the courts to decide whether or not a particular act
of a consul is one within his official capacity.
B. Extradition
With regard to treaties concerning extradition, it was reported in the
previous Survey that the convention with Brazil has been ratified by the
United States in 1961 while Brazil took no action. Nevertheless, an additional protocol was signed on June 18, 1962, clarifying the prohibition
against extradition of nationals of the requested country.'
Additional
conventions were signed with Sweden in 1961,186 and with Israel,'18 7 both
ratified. 8
A prominent case involving various aspects of the law of extradition,
arising both under domestic as well as treaty law, arose from the commitment to custody for extradition of the former president of Venezuela,
Perez Jimenez. In the habeas corpus proceedings, 8 9 the court clearly restated the limited grounds for review. These were noted to be jurisdiction
of the extradition magistrate, extraditability under the treaty for offenses
charged, and reasonable grounds to support the applicant's guilt. After
disposing of the petitioner's plea of sovereign immunity, discussed above,
and the alleged political nature of the crimes,11u and holding findings of
the court below on this point not reviewable, the court concentrated on
the question of whether or not the crimes charged to the petitioner were
extraditable under the treaty with Venezuela of 1922. In the opinion of
the court, a prima facie case had been established both by the evidence
184. 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 411 (1963). A federal court would take jurisdiction to enjoin
a foreign vice-consul acting without exequatur. Dominican Republic v. Peguero, 225 F.
Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
185. Additional Protocol to the Extradition Treaty of January 13, 1961 (text in 44
DEP'T STATE BULL. 164 (1961)), signed on June 18, 1962 (text in 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 125
(1963)); Accioly, Tratado de Extradicao corn os Estados Unidos, 15 (29/30) BOLETIM DA
SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE DmErro INTERNACIONAL 57 (1959).
186. 49 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 1022 (1963).
187. T.I.A.S. No. 5476; 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1022 (1963); 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 33
(1964).
188. The Extradition Treaty with Mexico (1899), as amended, 1902, 1925, and 1939,
is discussed by Franco, El Tratado de Extradicion entre Mexico y Estados Unidos, (38)
EL FoRo (4a ep.) 93 (1962); Hernandez Romo, El Amparo contra la Extradicion, (38) EL
FORO (4a ep.) 103 (1962). Cf. United States v. Marasco, 215 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
325 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Merino v. United States Marshall, 326 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1964).
189. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, supra note 164.
190. Garcia Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226 (1962). See also War Crimes and the Principle of Non-Extradition
of Political Offenders, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 269 (1963) ; Evans, Reflections Upon the Political
Defense in International Practice, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1963) ; de Vries & Rodriguez Novas,
Territorial Asylum in the Americas: Latin American Law and Practice of Extradition, 5
INTER-AMER CAN L. REV. 61, 72 (1963). Cf. In re Gonzales, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
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produced, by the "findings of the highest court [of Venezuela] that the
charges and evidence established cause for prosecution and arrest, the
warrant of arrest, and [by] a substantial quantity of evidence submitted
to the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela."'' Thus, the crucial.question remained as to whether or not these charges are offenses for which
extradition may be demanded under the treaty. The court found the
charges to be within the scope of article II, paragraphs 14, 18, and 20
of the treaty, dealing with "embezzlement or criminal malversation,"' 92
receiving property "knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained,"
and "fraud or breach of trust." However, in deciding this issue, the court
did not delve into the Venezuelan criminal code in force at the time of the
alleged commission of the charges, nor did it establish a definition of the
crimes under United States federal or state law, in order to satisfy
the generally accepted principle of double criminality, i.e., by showing
that acts charged are punishable both under the laws of the requesting
as well as requested country. This was particularly important here, since
the question was complicated by the fact that the criminal code of
Venezuela was changed after the ratification of the treaty, thus opening
the possibility that crimes included in the treaty did not coincide with
those punishable under the criminal code in force at the time of the
alleged commission of the crimes. Furthermore, a proper test of double
criminality necessarily brings into the picture American law, with the
added complication as to choice, or cumulation, of both federal and state
law. Instead, the court defined criminal malversation by replying on
Webster's New InternationalDictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary,
and Black's Law Dictionary, which are at best, rather weak sources of
authority for the question presented.
Subsequent attempts on the part of the petitioner to be released on
bail remained unsuccessful,'98 the court held that "no amount of money
could answer the damage that would be sustained by the United States
were the applicant to be released on bond, flee the jurisdiction, and be
unavailable for surrender," adding that the obligation "of this country
under the treaty with Venezuela is of paramount importance."' 4 Finally,
extradition was ordered by the Secretary of State, 9 ' and, after an equally
unsuccessful appeal for stay of extradition to the Supreme Court, 9 " Perez
Jimenez was extradited to Venezuelan authorities in Miami on August
16, 1963.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
CoLum.
196.

Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962).
Cf. In re Wise, 168 F. Supp. 366, 370 (S.D. Tex. 1957).
Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 314 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 653.
49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 364 (1963). Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62
L. R1v. 1278 (1962).
Jimenez v. United States District Court, 84 Sup. Ct. 14 (1963).
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C. Aliens
The influx of Cuban refugees into Florida presented local as well as
federal authorities with a number of problems.' 1 . In 1962, Congress
enacted the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act 9 " which gave the
President authority to determine what assistance to refugees would be
"in the interest of the United States." Refugees were defined as aliens
who, (1) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion, fled from a nation or area of the Western
Hemisphere; (2) cannot return thereto because of fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion, and (3) are in urgent need
of assistance for the essentials of life. Means so provided may also be
used for assistance to state or local public agencies
providing services for substantial numbers of individuals who
meet the requirements of subparagraph (3) (other than clause
C) for (a) health services and educational services to such individuals, and (b) special training for employment and services
related thereto; for transportation and resettlement, for the
establishment of projects for employment or refresher professional training ....

199

As indicated in another study, 00 aliens may appear in Florida courts
as plaintiffs. These suits have become more numerous and state courts, in
most cases, have shown no reluctance to keep their doors open. In Confederation of Life Ass'n v. Ugalde,2 1 the court held that "the courts of
Florida . . . [are] open to Cuban citizens, while here, to seek redress

for a wrong remediable in law, under section 4 of the Declaration of
Rights of Florida."20 2 The same position was taken in Lorido v. PanAmerican Life Ins. Co.,2"' where the court declined to "deny justice to
Cuban nationals, . . . [rejecting] the contention that the courts of this
country should not afford a forum to these distressed plaintiffs who find
themselves homeless and without remedy in their own country." The court
supported its position with a complete quotation from the poem inscribed
on the Statue of Liberty.0 4
197. Mitchell, The Cuban Refugee Program, 25 SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 3 (1962);
Martin, United States Outlines Policy Toward Cuban Refugees, 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 983
(1963).
198. 76 Stat. 121 (1962).
199. Chommie, The University of Miami Program for Cuban Lawyers: A Report, 5
INTER-AM. L. Rav. 177 (1963).
200. Bayitch, Aliens in Florida, 12 U. MIAMi L. REv. 129 (1958).
201. 151 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
202. Id. at 323.
203. 19 Fla. Supp. 167 (Cir. Ct. 1962).
204. Contra, Jorge v. Antonio Co., 19 Fla. Supp. 101 (Cir. Ct. 1962), wherein the court
stated that "this court is not obliged to try suits involving the laws of a foreign country
or controversies between citizens of foreign countries and their government. Citizens of foreign countries, such as Cuba, should look to the law of their own country for relief. Comity
does not require that this controversy be tried by this court." The case was dismissed under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In contrast, this doctrine was found inapplicable'in
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The legal status of refugees was further explored in Blanco v. PanAmerican Life Ins. Co."° In order to decide the question of whether or
not the present Cuban government has the international authority to
subject, in personam, Cuban refugees to its municipal law, the court
adopted the theory of political refugees falling into the "category of res
nullius," and found that "allegiance is an obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes his government in return for the protection which he receives." This fidelity was renounced by the Cuban
refugees. Therefore, these "former political citizens of a Cuba that has
ceased to be (with some inchoate allegiance to a Cuba they hope may
come into existence sometime in the future), are at present political citizens of nowhere. 2 00 However, they are "civil citizens of Florida based on
their domicile here, and they are possessed of our municipal rights and
obligated for domestic municipal duties." In view of this as well as the
territorial application of the Cuban decrees involved, the court concluded
that these refugees "are not subject to its [Cuba's] in personam jurisdiction," in the sense of legislative power.20 7
Greater difficulties have arisen with regard to political activities of
Cuban refugees, involving delicate duties imposed by international law
and conventions of the asylum country,0 8 particularly where revolutionary or even military actions were involved. In the 'beginning, the application of controlling federal statutes was rather lenient, particularly in
connection with the.Bay of Pigs invasion attempted by Cuban nationals.
Later, after the break with the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the Department of State took a stronger position. 0 9 With regard to international
obligations, the Havana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in
the Event of Civil Strife2 10 controls, while the amendment signed in
Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 31 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962), wherein
the court held that courts in Cuba do not present the necessary alternative. Cuban refugees
here on a temporary non-immigrant visa have been held to be unable to rightfully and
in good faith, make a residence purchased in Florida, their "permanent home" within art.
10, § 7 of the Florida Constitution, and therefore, not entitled to homestead tax exemption.
Juarrero v. McNayre, 157 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1963).
205. 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
206. Id. at 228.
207. Id. at 229.
208. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons
Against Foreign States (1962); Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities of Private Persons
Against Foreign States, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 105 (1928); Powers, Treason by Domiciled
Aliens, MILIARY L. REV. 123 (July, 1962); Preuss, International Responsibility for Hostile
Propaganda Against Foreign States, 28 Am. J. INT'L L. 649 (1934). See also THOMAS &
THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 338 (1963). The Logan Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 953, which prohibits correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government, was
involved when a private citizen attempted to halt loading of ransom goods in exchange for
Cuban invaders held prisoners in Cuba. A municipal judge held the citizen guilty of disorderly conduct. The question also came up in a federal court in Miami. Miami Herald,
March 24, 1963, p. 16-A. However no cases have been reported.
209. 48 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 600 (1963). See United States v. Esperdy, 203 F. Supp. 389
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963) (American
national lost citizenship because of membership in Castro's army).
210. 46 Stat. 2749 (1928).
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1957211 has not yet been ratified by the United States. The general attitude on the part of Latin American countries is reflected in the draft for
an interamerican Convention Regarding the Regime of Political Exiles,
Asylees, and Refugees,"' adopted in 1953 by the Interamerican Council
of Jurists. An expression of attitudes prevailing in the United Nations
might be found in the Draft Code of Offenses against Peace and Security
of Mankind,.1 8 drafted by the International Law Commission of the
United Nations.
211. Protocol to the Convention of Feb. 20, 1928, on Duties and Rights of States in
Event of Civil Strife (signed in Washington, May 1, 1957, obtained Senate advice and consent in 1959) ; see text in 284 U.N.T.S. 201. Podesta Costa, La Revisidn de la Convencidn
Interamericana sobre Derecho y Deberes de los Estados en Caso de Luchas Civiles, 1949
INTER-AmERICAN JUR. YB. 9 (1950); THOMAS & ThomAs, NON-INTERvENTION:
AND ITS IMPORT iN THE AmERICAS 215 (1956).
212. 5 AsesALs OF THE O.A.S. 165 (1953).
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213. 1951 YB. OF THE U.N. 842 (1952). See also 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 123 (Supp. 1951).

